Reason and Value
The relations between reason, motivation and value present problems which, though ancient, remain intractable. If values are objective and rational how can they move us and if they are dependent on our contingent desires how can they be rational? E. J. Bond makes a bold attack on this dilemma. The widespread view among philosophers today is that judgements contain an irreducible element of personal commitment. To this Professor Bond proposes an account of values as objective and value judgements as true or false, employing a distinction between grounding and motivating reasons to establish their connection with action. He defines and tests his position against a number of recent theories, providing in the process forceful criticism of Williams, Wiggins, Foot, Narveson and Nagel, among others. A distinctive contribution to the subject, it will stimulate interest and worthwhile debate among philosophers, while also serving as an introduction to this vital topic.
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achievable by action aesthetic agreeable akrasia appetite argued argument from queerness axiological Bernard Williams Brahms Category claim cognitivism cognitivist consequence course deliberation deny deontic moral reasons desired end enjoy evil experience explanation external reasons fact-value distinction feeling future desires future well-being genuine Gert Gilbert Harman grounding reasons hedonic value hedonist hence inclination inherently desirable intrinsically irrational kind of value matter means moral values morally required motivating reasons motivational propensity Nagel Narveson necessary condition non-cognitivism non-cognitivist objective value one's oneself Owen Wingrave pain person Philippa Foot pleasant pleasure possess practical judgments present desires propositional attitudes psychological hedonism question R. M. Hare rational agent rationally motivated Rawls reason exists reasons and values reasons for action recognize reflective desire regard respect sake satisfaction satisfy sense simply subjective sufficient condition supposed theory tied to values true truth utilitarianism valuations value achievable value or worth virtue want-satisfaction Wiggins