Reasons for Belief
Andrew Reisner, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Cambridge University Press, Jun 2, 2011 - Philosophy
Philosophers have long been concerned about what we know and how we know it. Increasingly, however, a related question has gained prominence in philosophical discussion: what should we believe and why? This volume brings together twelve new essays that address different aspects of this question. The essays examine foundational questions about reasons for belief, and use new research on reasons for belief to address traditional epistemological concerns such as knowledge, justification and perceptually acquired beliefs. This book will be of interest to philosophers working on epistemology, theoretical reason, rationality, perception and ethics. It will also be of interest to cognitive scientists and psychologists who wish to gain deeper insight into normative questions about belief and knowledge.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
accept agent Alan Millar all-things-considered reason anti-Humeanism argue argument attitude belief-forming processes capacities categorical reasons claim cognitive cognitivism committed concept conclusion constitute content view Cuneo defeaters deliberation deny depends disposition doxastically justified entail epistemic error theory epistemic judgements epistemic norms epistemic properties epistemic reasons epistemic value epistemology evidential evidentialist evil demon example experiences at face explain face value fact false form beliefs high bar Humean ibuprofen inconsistent triad intention internalist intuition involve John Broome justified belief kind knowledge mental metaethics Moorean moral motivation non-cognitivism non-cognitivist normative reasons normative requirements package perceptual experience plausible question rational requirements reason to believe reason to form reasons for belief relation relevant reliable representational content response role seems sense simply sort Steglich-Petersen suppose swamping problem teleological account Terence Cuneo theoretical rationality theorist there’s thesis things true belief undefeated reason value pluralism warrant to believe water crisis wide-scope