Regulated competition in health insurance markets
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2000 - Health insurance policies - 32 pages
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Explaining the Nash equilibrium of the model
Asymmetry information and dynamics
1 other sections not shown
activities by insurers adverse selection assume asymmetric information attract consumers bad risks Bettendorf bilboard CENTRAAL PLANBUREAU community-rated premium competition among insurers CPB Netherlands delivery of medical dynamic Economic effect efficient delivery equalization and compensation Gravenhage health care costs health care insurers health care providers Health Insurance Markets high and low high risks higher impact implies insurance company insurer profits insurer receives invest in efficiency ISBN J.J. Graafland low and high low risks medical risk medical services Nash equilibrium Netherlands number of enrollees number of insurers objective function optimal P.O. Box perfect risk adjustment policies population price elasticities price sensitive profit function prospective and retrospective prospective payments rated premiums realised health regulated competition reimbursement schemes retrospective compensation retrospective payments returns to scale risk adjustment scheme risk characteristics risk type risk-selection risk-type specific selection role Sdu/CPB specific selection activities substitution effect symmetry Total consumer premiums type of risk undertake efficiency activities