Rent Intensity and Economic Performance |
Common terms and phrases
absolute savings adverse selection agent's share aggregate assumption allocation principle Assuming symmetry average output falls Brock cooperative labor enterprise Cournot-Nash agents degree h distributional effort economic system endogenous rent entrants join exogenous Fabella falls with population feudal societies fixed capital accumulation GNP growth growth model Hillman homogeneous of degree identical endowment increasing returns inferior economic performance initially poorer intensity of rent liberal democratic system literature Magee and Young metaphor microeconomic microfoundation moral hazard Murphy Nash equilibrium number of participants Olson outperform output loss period Pl.iii population grows progressive impoverishment Proposition public choice R₁ rent intensity rent seeking a>0 rent spending rent-seeking residual claimant returns is small rises with rent rudimentary dynamic counterpart S₁ savings rate Schleifer and Vishny seeking and economic share economy share society single market static stylized observations symmetric Cournot symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium total output Tullock dissipation rate unproductive value-adding investment value-redistributing investment whole economy