Reshaping Economic and Monetary Union: Membership Rules and Budget Policies in Germany, France and Spain
Following Maastricht, national governments found themselves pushed into distinctive roles, as promoters, gatekeepers, reformers and defectors, as voter preferences and central bank powers combined in different ways to create clear incentives for politicians. These roles explain the push from certain countries for specific changes to EMU rules, why some countries needed EMU more than others and under what conditions pressure to create an economic government for Europe could succeed or fail.
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