Russian Strategic Modernization: Past and Future
This invaluable study provides a unique insider's view of the history of Soviet and Russian policy on nuclear weapons modernization and charts the future evolution of the Russian strategic arsenal. Using information that has only recently become available and introducing new, previously unknown data, Sokov concludes that the most important force behind the evolution of the Soviet and Russian strategic arsenal was the military itself, which sought to increase strategic stability by enhancing the survivability of weapons systems. The highly destabilizing posture of the 1970s and 1980s was, he argues, in a sense 'accidental,' resulting from the failure of several R&D programs and specific features of the Soviet decisionmaking mechanism. The author demonstrates that the role of such factors as the economic crisis, U.S. modernization programs, and general Russian foreign policy goals has been exaggerated by Western analysts. No matter how hard-pressed, Russia will hold to its current plans, Sokov argues. At the same time, the military will be unlikely to engage in a new arms buildup even if the economic situation improves or a nationalist government comes to power. Instead, stability will be sought through better quality of weapons at progressively lower levels. Introducing a wealth of new information on Soviet and Russian national security policymaking, the author explores in meticulous detail such key issues as decisions on weapons development, arms-control negotiations, and the handling of the Soviet nuclear arsenal after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The reader will be able to follow the debates and intrigues between military planners, diplomats, and weapons designers as they clashed over the choice of acquisition programs and negotiating positions. With its combination of informed analysis and use of new documentation, this work will be invaluable for all concerned with U.S.-Russian strategic relations.
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agencies agreement Air Force Akhromeev ALCMs Alexei American Anatoli April arms control Baker Cold War concentration of warheads concessions conﬂict conventional created crisis de-MIRVing decision decision-making defense industry delivery vehicles deployed deployment deputy design bureau deterrence Duma economic elimination Foreign Ministry future Gorbachev Group of Five heavy bombers heavy ICBMs Igor inﬂuence Interfax Izvestiya James Baker Kazakhstan Kosovo Kozyrev limit Miass minister Ministry of Defense MIRVed ICBMs mobile ICBMs modernization programs Moscow NATO negotiations Nezavisimaya Gazeta nonnuclear number of warheads Pavel Podvig plans Politburo political position production Project 667 BDRM Project 941 proposals reduction reﬂected role Rossii Russia Russian strategic second-strike Sergei Shevardnadze silo-based SLBM solid-fuel Solomonov Soviet military Soviet strategic Soviet Union SSBN START II strategic forces strategic modernization strategic posture strategic stability strategic weapons submarines tactical nuclear weapons threat tion Topol Topol-M triad types Ukraine United views Vladimir warheads Yeltsin Yuri Yuzhnoe