Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "unity of Effort" in American Counterinsurgency

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Strategic Studies Institute, 2010 - Afghan War, 2001- - 132 pages
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The stage -- The state and the insurgency : theory in the American context -- Different models -- Public support : the center of gravity -- The American response -- COIN operations -- Today's challenges in Afghanistan -- Conventional bias -- Provincial reconstruction teams -- Afghanistan by design -- Origins -- The concept -- Structure -- Chain of command -- Nation team -- A shift in strategy -- The move to Kabul -- Reorganizing the military -- Civil-military reality -- Problems at the national and regional levels -- Changes in Kabul -- Regional dynamic for the PRTs -- INTRA-PRT dynamics -- Lack of guidance and uncertain command -- Cult of personality -- The difficulty of distant command -- Military dominance -- Antecedents from Vietnam -- A long road -- Focus on counterinsurgency -- Failure to change -- The arrival of Komer -- CORDS : "can OCO really do something?" -- Civil-military integration, at last -- Vertical organization -- Team structure -- Assessment by participants -- Chain of command -- Performance in the field -- Problems -- Effects and evaluation -- Results -- Finale -- Lessons from Vietnam -- The Army's reaction to the Vietnam War -- Why the segregated response? -- Cultural differences -- The Military -- State and other civilian agencies -- Pink on pink -- "It didn't take Lincoln this long" -- World War II, its general, and the American psyche -- The American way of war -- Team America -- MacArthur's legacy -- The role of unity of command : an examination of doctrine and language -- Unity of effort : the fruit of unity of command -- The path to unified authority within the military -- Joint doctrine and the principle of command -- Unity of command begets unity of effort -- Unity of effort : the best hope in absence of unity of command -- The multiagency alternative -- Differences in joint publication terminology -- Foreigners -- JP 3-08 terms and the broader government -- Prospects -- Insurgency -- The concerns about unified authority -- The ameliorative effects of unified authority -- Eliminating remote management -- Diminishing the role of personality : lifting the floor, not raising the roof -- Coupling authority with responsibility -- A new structure -- Model -- The country team -- The tactical level -- ISAF -- Achieving the new model -- CODA.
 

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