Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "unity of Effort" in American Counterinsurgency
The stage -- The state and the insurgency : theory in the American context -- Different models -- Public support : the center of gravity -- The American response -- COIN operations -- Today's challenges in Afghanistan -- Conventional bias -- Provincial reconstruction teams -- Afghanistan by design -- Origins -- The concept -- Structure -- Chain of command -- Nation team -- A shift in strategy -- The move to Kabul -- Reorganizing the military -- Civil-military reality -- Problems at the national and regional levels -- Changes in Kabul -- Regional dynamic for the PRTs -- INTRA-PRT dynamics -- Lack of guidance and uncertain command -- Cult of personality -- The difficulty of distant command -- Military dominance -- Antecedents from Vietnam -- A long road -- Focus on counterinsurgency -- Failure to change -- The arrival of Komer -- CORDS : "can OCO really do something?" -- Civil-military integration, at last -- Vertical organization -- Team structure -- Assessment by participants -- Chain of command -- Performance in the field -- Problems -- Effects and evaluation -- Results -- Finale -- Lessons from Vietnam -- The Army's reaction to the Vietnam War -- Why the segregated response? -- Cultural differences -- The Military -- State and other civilian agencies -- Pink on pink -- "It didn't take Lincoln this long" -- World War II, its general, and the American psyche -- The American way of war -- Team America -- MacArthur's legacy -- The role of unity of command : an examination of doctrine and language -- Unity of effort : the fruit of unity of command -- The path to unified authority within the military -- Joint doctrine and the principle of command -- Unity of command begets unity of effort -- Unity of effort : the best hope in absence of unity of command -- The multiagency alternative -- Differences in joint publication terminology -- Foreigners -- JP 3-08 terms and the broader government -- Prospects -- Insurgency -- The concerns about unified authority -- The ameliorative effects of unified authority -- Eliminating remote management -- Diminishing the role of personality : lifting the floor, not raising the roof -- Coupling authority with responsibility -- A new structure -- Model -- The country team -- The tactical level -- ISAF -- Achieving the new model -- CODA.
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advisors Afghan Afghan government AirLand Battle Ambassador American efforts American forces Army ARVN assistance Association for Diplomatic Barbara Nielsen Barno in discussion bureaucratic CFC-A chain of command Chief of Mission Civil Affairs civil-military civilian agencies civilian and military coalition COIN efforts combat Commander in discussion conventional coordination CORDS counterinsurgency culture David Barno Debrief Defense departmental deployed deputy Diplomatic Studies direct discussion with author doctrine DPSA effects efforts in Afghanistan Embassy FSO discussion funding Ibid Institute of Peace insurgency integration interview by Barbara ISAF July 18 July 20 Kabul Komer maneuver units multiagency NGOs officer organization pacification Peace and Association personnel political programs Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRT commander PRT Representative Regional Commands reporting responsibility Saigon senior soldiers South Vietnam staff strategy structure Studies and Training subordinates transcript U.S. Department U.S. Government unified authority United States Institute unity of command unity of effort USAID representative Vietnamese Washington