Signaling Games in Political ScienceFirst Published in 1991. This monograph surveys the current literature on game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics. Such work generalises earlier models by allowing relevant information to be asymmetrically held by agents, and subsequently studying the willingness and ability of these agents to transmit information through their actions. The monograph includes models of agenda control in legislatures and elections, veto threats and debate, electoral competition, regulation building, bargaining in the shadow of war and sophisticated voting. Within each topic the principal focus is on how the presence of asymmetric information enriches the strategic environment of the participants as well as how it rationalises certain types of political behavior and political institutions as equilibrium phenomena in an 'incomplete information' world. |
Contents
| 1 | |
| 3 | |
3 Agenda Control | 27 |
4 Rhetoric and Debate | 48 |
5 Electoral Competition | 58 |
6 Reputation and Leadership | 67 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
ability accept adverse selection agenda control alternative assume assumption auditing Austen-Smith Banks 13 best response budget candidates choice closed rule committee committee’s complete information Condorcet winner cost costless signaling games Crawford and Sobel crisis bargaining current model decision denote Economics Section equilib equilibrium behavior equilibrium messages equilibrium outcome equilibrium path equilibrium proposal equilibrium refinements equilibrium strategies escalate ex ante exists expected utility finite floor function Gilligan and Krehbiel Harrington 40 hence ideal outcome implying incentive compatibility indifferent induced ideal point informational asymmetries intuitive criterion Krehbiel 36 legislator Marxian Economics median voter open rule out-of-equilibrium message parameter payoff Peter Ordeshook players Political Science pooling equilibria positive probability posterior belief Powell 65 prior belief procedure provide the incentive pure strategies receiver receiver’s rejects result revealed sender separating equilibrium sequential equilibrium signaling games Sobel 28 Spence model strictly symmetric equilibrium unique Us(t Volume wage zero