Signaling Goodness: Social Rules and Public Choice
University of Michigan Press, 2003 - Business & Economics - 261 pages
Political, intellectual, and academic discourse in the United States has been awash in political correctness, which has itself been berated and defended -- yet little understood. As a corrective, Nelson and Greene look at a more general process: adopting political positions to enhance one's reputation for trustworthiness both to others and to oneself.
Phillip Nelson and Kenneth Greene are Professors of Economics in the Department of Economics at the State University of New York, Binghamton.
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Charity and Evolution
Charity and Reciprocity
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activists activity advocates altruism amount associates asymmetric average believe benefits bias chapter charitable contributions charity church attendance Clean Air Act college teachers community involvement compassion conscience consequence conservative cost of lying cost-benefit analysis decisions Democratic demonstrations Dependent Variables determining difference donors dummy East South Central economic economists effect elections environmental equation ethnic group evidence expect expenditures explain favor initiators free-rider problem friends give greater group selection hunter-gatherer hypothesis imitation impact important increase individual interest issues lags latter less Lichter marginal utility maximize group survival media bias moocher morality signaling motivated narrow self-interest nonuse value occupations one's percent person political positions poor predict preferences probability reciprocity redistribution regression coefficients regulation relationship relative relevant Republican reputational variables role SCCIT signaling theory significant slope social rules societies sociobiology standard theory tion trustworthiness utility voters voting participation warm glow