Brian Skyrms presents eighteen essays which apply adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory. Altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling are treated from this perspective. Correlation is seen to be of fundamental importance. Interactions with neighbors in space, on static networks, and on co-evolving dynamics networks are investigated. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics.
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agent analysis ball bargaining game base game basin of attraction Biology cheap talk chooses cliques color conformist bias convergence coordination game correlation Defect defectors demand denote dynamical system Economic Behavior eigenvalues equations Erev evolutionarily stable strategy evolutionary dynamics evolutionary game theory evolve example fair division fictitious play Figure finite population game dynamics Hare Hunters Hofbauer hunt stag individuals infinite initial interaction structure iterations Journal Lemma Liapunov function limit Markov fictitious play Mathematical matrix mutation Nash equilibrium norms Nowak number of signals orbits pair parameter partition percent players polymorphism population proportions positive possible pre-play signaling Prisoner’s Dilemma probability random receiver receiver’s reinforcement learning replicator dynamics risk dominant sender sends signal signaling games simulations Skyrms and Pemantle Social Contract social network Stag Hunt game Stag Hunters stochastic strange attractor structurally stable symmetric take turns Theorem Three’s Company unstable urn model vector visits weights zero