What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
abort accident According According to NASA accounting actions added additional analysis approved assessment Associate Administrator Assurance astronauts Base booster brakes Category cause Center changes Commission report Committee communications completed concept contractor criteria Critical Items Criticality decision Deputy Director determine developed direction effort element Engineering ensure escape established facilities failure Flight Crew Operations flight rate hardware hazard identify implementation improvements included increase independent inspections Installing Integration issued joint June Kennedy landing launch loss Maintainability maintenance meet mission modified MSFC NASA officials NASA's needed nosewheel steering system NSTS Operations orbiter organization panel performance position present Presidential Commission problems Program Manager Quality redesign relating reliability removal request requirements responsibilities result runway safety scheduled Shuttle Program SIAP solid rocket motor Space Center Space Flight specific recommendations SRM&QA status structure Team tests tire vehicle waived weather
Page 7 - Challenger was caused by a failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Motor. The specific failure was the destruction of the seals that are intended to prevent hot gases from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor.
Page 30 - The Commission recommends that NASA: Make all efforts to provide a crew escape system for use during controlled gliding flight. Make every effort to increase the range of flight conditions under which an emergency runway landing can be successfully conducted in the event that two or three main engines fail early in ascent.
Page 15 - ... the safety of flight 51-L to other vital elements of Shuttle program management. • NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate this tendency at Marshall Space Flight Center, whether by changes of personnel, organization, indoctrination or all three. A policy should be developed which governs the imposition and removal of Shuttle launch constraints. Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission Management Team meetings should be recorded . The flight crew commander, or a designated representative,...
Page 12 - OTA at the request of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
Page 14 - ... Management. The Commission observes that there appears to be a departure from the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s relating to the use of astronauts in management positions. These individuals brought to their positions flight experience and a keen appreciation of operations and flight safety. • NASA should encourage the transition of qualified astronauts into agency management positions. • The function of the Flight Crew Operations director should be elevated in the NASA organization structure....
Page 1 - NASA's actions to address the recommendations presented in the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, dated 6 June, 1986.
Page 34 - Flight Rate. The nation's reliance on the Shuttle as its principal space launch capability created a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the flight rate. Such reliance on a single launch capability should be avoided in the future. NASA must establish a flight rate that is consistent with its resources.
Page 22 - Maintainability — A measure of the ease and rapidity with which a system or equipment can be restored to operational status following a failure, expressed as the probability that an item will be retained in or restored to a specified condition within a given period of time when the maintenance is performed in accordance with precribed procedures and resources.
Page 21 - Safety Organization. NASA should establish an Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance to be headed by an Associate Administrator, reporting directly to the NASA Administrator. It would have direct authority for safety, reliability, and quality assurance throughout the agency. The office should be assigned the work force to ensure adequate oversight of its functions and should be independent of other NASA functional and program responsibilities.