Strategic decisionmaking in cabinet government: institutional underpinnings and obstacles, Part 294
"Collective cabinet decisionmaking provides the institutional mechanism by which many governments prioritize their policies and guard against unpredictable policy reversals."- Mansood Ahmed, Vice President, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, The World BankThe style and membership of cabinets vary in every country. The heads of democratic governments form a cabinet for three principal reasons:1. The threat that the legislature will significantly amend the government's program as expressed in the budget proposals made by the executive.2. The threat of dismissal between elections.3. The risk that the executive will be seen by the public as having departed from a previous tradition of cabinet government and judged poorly as a result.'Strategic Decisionmaking in Cabinet Government' shows that cabinet government is a rational response to these risks and sets out the institutional arrangements that make the cabinet a binding device. This report recognizes the significance of the budget process for collective decisionmaking, but moves beyond the simplistic assumption that tradeoffs in cabinet government can only be made by reallocating the budget. It supports practical approaches for assessing the strength of cabinet decisionmaking arrangements and for identifying practical steps to improve the prospect that decisions will be collectively binding.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Number of Cabinet Committees
Size of OECD Cabinets in 1996 and Trends for 198795
Areas in Which Cabinets Vary Widely
12 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Alesina Alex Matheson allocations amend Australia binding Blondel budget preparation budgetary cabi cabinet agenda cabinet committees cabinet decisionmaking cabinet decisions cabinet government cabinet meeting cabinet ministers cabinet office cabinet prior cabinet-like Canada cash rationing civil servants coalition governments Commonwealth Secretariat constitutional coordination countries credible and enforceable Department Development discussion Economic elections ensure ernment Estonia executive Finland formal France full cabinet Gambia Germany Hagen head of gov head of government incentives inet institutional arrangements Ireland issues Koenen-Grant legislature Lithuania major policy priorities Malawi Management ment minister of finance Muller-Rommel negotiations Netherlands OECD office or chancellery options parliament parliamentary party played The rules policymaking political portfolios president presidential systems proposals Public Administration public sector realistic prospect reform risk role rules are credible Sector Investment Program sector ministries Seimas Setting the major spending staff Sweden threat tions tradeoffs Ukraine United Kingdom World Bank Zealand cabinet