Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning

Richard K. Betts

Brookings Institution Press, Dec 1, 2010 - History - 318 pages

Long before Germany's blitzkrieg swept the West, European leaders had received many signals of its imminence. Stalin, too, had abundant warning of German designs on Russia but believed that by avoiding "provocative" defensive measures he could avert the attack that finally came in June 1941. And the stories of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, and three Arab-Israeli conflicts are replete with missed opportunities to react to unmistakable warnings. Richad K. Betts analyzes surprise attacks during the mid-twentieth century to illustrate his thesis: surprise attacks occur, not because intelligence services fail to warn, but because of the disbelief of political leaders.

"Although the probability is low that the United States will fail to deter direct attack by the Soviet Union," Betts says, "the intensity of the threat warrants painstaking analysis of how to cope with it." His own investigation of the historical, psychological, political, diplomatic, and military aspects of his subject heightens understanding of why surprise attacks succeed and why victim nations fail to respond to warnings. In discussing current policy he focuses on the defense of Western Europe and applies the lessons of history to U.S. defense planning, offering detailed recommendations for changes in strategy. Obviously some of the potential dangers of military surprise cannot be prevented. The important thing, he emphasizes, is that "without forces that exceed requirements (the solution Moscow appears to have chosen), it is vital to ensure that what forces exist can be brought to bear when needed.

Contents

• Deterrence Shock and Defense: 3
• Why Surprise Is Important: 4
• The Balance of Emphasis: 12
• Deterrence and the Unforeseen: 19
• Sudden Attacks in World War II: 27
• Blitzkrieg in the West: 28
• Blitzkrieg in the East: 34
• The Attack on Pearl Harbor: 42
• Sudden Attacks in the Postwar Era: 51
• Chinese Intervention in Korea: 56
• The Sinai Campaign: 63
• The Six Day War: 65
• The October War: 68
• The Invasion of Czechoslovakia: 81
• Why Surprise Succeeds I Operational Causes: 87
• Limits to Predictability: 95
• Circumventing Deterrence: 111
• Why Surprise Succeeds II The Fog of Peace: 119
• Interpretation and Reaction: 120
• Risk and Rationality: 127
• Defensive Surprise: 141
• The NATO Central Front I Politics: 153
• Context for Surprise: 154
• Soviet Defensive Surprise: 162
• Alliance Politics and Military Response: 170
• Reinforcement Slack and Friction: 177
• The NATO Central Front II Operations: 189
• Soviet Choices for Surprise: 199
• How NATO Might Cope: 207
• Nuclear Surprise: 228
• The Threat in Context: 229
• Escalation Doctrine and SelfSurprise: 239
• Technical Dimensions of Surprise: 246
• Beyond the Central Front: 255
• The Fringes of NATO: 256
• The Persian Gulf: 261
• Korea: 273
• Conclusion: 281
• Hedging Against Surprise: 285
• Warning and Response: 286
• Strategy and Posture: 295
• Negotiations and Deterrence: 303
• Index: 313

Bibliographic information

• Title: Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning
• Author: Richard K. Betts
• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press, 2010
• ISBN: 0815719477, 9780815719472
• Length: 318 pages
• Subjects: History / Military / Strategy