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absolute acquired by experience actions actual sensations admit affirms analysis argument ascertain assert assume battle character circumstances conceive conscious existence data of consciousness denies desire distinction distinguish doctrine evil expe fact of consciousness finite give ground Hamilton Hamilton's philosophy hypothesis idea imagine inconceivable inexplicable infer infinite space infinity intuitive means ment merely metaphysical difficulty Mill's mind and matter moral cause moral character morally responsible natural laws nature necessary beliefs necessitarian negation negative conception ness never non-ego non-self opinions ourselves permanent possibilities phenomena pion Plato possess possibilities of sensation possibility of feeling possible sensations postulate present priori element priori philosophy prove punishment question reason refute rience right and wrong sense senseless thing series of feelings Sir William Hamilton suppose tells theory of mind thing thinker thought tion transcendentalists true truth ultimate facts Universal Cause veracity of memory volition whilst wholly
50. oldal - The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion.
75. oldal - The true incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present — that a series of feelings the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality. I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes place, and, when we are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume...
75. oldal - If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
51. oldal - ... the sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection ; that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
51. oldal - These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.
28. oldal - But reason itself must rest at last upon " authority ; for the original data of reason do not rest on " reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the " authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, " therefore, in rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it " is that, in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophi" cally admit that belief is the primary condition of reason, " and not reason the ultimate ground of belief.
44. oldal - I did will or nill anything, I was most sure that no other than myself did will and nill: and I all but saw that there was the cause of my sin.
51. oldal - The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others ; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him ; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe.
68. oldal - ... to us and to our fellow-creatures; the actual sensations are not. That which other people become aware of when and on the same grounds as I do, seems more real to me than that which they do not know of unless I tell them. The world of possible sensations succeeding one another according to laws is as much in other beings as it is in me; it has therefore an existence outside me; it is an external world.