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according action activity Anaxagoras animals appear apperceptive arise Aristotle association auditory nerve bodily body brain called cause colour combination complex conceive concepts condition connexion consciousness consequence consider corresponding degree desire dissimilation distance distinct distinguish effect elements emotion Empedocles ence ethnic psychology excited existence experience external fact faculties feelings fibres follows fusion ical images imagination immediately impressions intellectual kind knowledge less magnitude manner matter means medullary substance memory ment mental monad motion movement nature nerves object observe optic nerve organ original pain particular passions perceive perception phenomena physiological Plato pleasure present principle processes produced Protagoras psychical psychology psychophysical qualities reason regard relation retina rience Scholium sensation sense sensible sensorium sight similar simple ideas smell Socrates soul sound stimulus substance successive suppose taste Theaet Theaetetus things thought tion touch truth understanding vibrations visual volition Weber's law words
Page 235 - Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception * of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without...
Page 658 - My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.
Page 276 - Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see; quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?
Page 280 - The common degrees of these are easily distinguished; tho' it is not impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas.
Page 233 - ... trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not. These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties...
Page 244 - Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, ie, by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c., these I call secondary qualities.
Page 273 - The extension, figures, and motions, perceived by sight, are specifically distinct from the ideas of touch, called by the same names ; nor is there any such thing as one idea, or kind of idea, common to both senses.
Page 667 - That the skin is much affected under the sense of great fear, we see in the marvellous manner in which perspiration immediately exudes from it. This exudation is all the more remarkable, as the surface is then cold, and hence the term, a cold sweat; whereas the sudorific glands are properly excited into action when the surface is heated.
Page 362 - If, therefore, we attend to that act of our mind, which we call the perception of an external object of sense, we shall find in it these three things. First, Some conception or notion of the object perceived. Secondly, A strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence ; .and, Thirdly, That this conviction and belief are immediate, and not the effect of reasoning.