The Collegial Phenomenon: The Social Mechanisms of Cooperation Among Peers in a Corporate Law Partnership
Oxford University Press, 2001 - Business & Economics - 346 pages
This text provides a grounded theory of the collegial form of organization. It is based on a network analysis of a traditional and successful Northeastern US corporate law firm in which partners locked themselves in a co-operative and long-term situation without much hierarchy and formal power differences to enforce their agreements. Members of the firm (partners and asssociates) are portrayed as interdependent entrepreneurs who both build social niches in their firm and cultivate status competition among themselves. They need to engage in such behaviour in order to manage various types of resources that are vital in knowledge-intensive, project-oriented organizations (colleagues' goodwill, professional advice, social support) and to fulfil their commitment to this extremely constraining contract. This behaviour generates informal social mechanisms (generalized exchange, lateral control, oligarchic regulation) on which this type of organization is shown to depend for its self-governance.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
A Structural Theory of Collective Action among Peers
Spencer Grace Robbins
A Specific Exchange System
Economic Performance and Quality Control
Too Many Chefs?
A Montesquieu Structure
A Lateral Control Regime
MultiStatus Oligarchs and the Negotiation of Precarious Values
actors advice network advisers analysis behaviour Blau bounded solidarity broadly conceived structural Chapter choices of levers clients colleagues collective action collegial organizations committee constraints cooperation corporate corporate law dimensions dyadic economic performance effect example exchange system formal structure forms of status free-rider problem friends friendship network important individual informal infractors interdependence interests issue knowledge knowledge-intensive lateral control regime law firms lawyers Lazega litigation managing partner members of Positions minders Montesquieu multi-status multiplex norms Office oligarchs organizational parameter partners and associates partnership meetings pattern peer review politicized Position Five Position Four Position Three precarious values pressure problem professional Pseudolikelihood quality control rainmakers reciprocated regulatory relational capital relationships represented respondent rules sanctioners senior associates senior partners SG&R share social capital social mechanisms social niches speciality specific status competition status inconsistency strong co-workers substructures target task forces tended unreciprocated