The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics“A lucidly written, shrewdly argued meditation on how democrats and dictators preserve political authority.” —Wall Street Journal Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s canonical book on political science turns conventional wisdom on its head. They start from a single proposition: leaders do whatever keeps them in power. They don’t care about the “national interest”—or even their subjects—unless they must. As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith show, democracy is essentially just a convenient fiction. Governments do not differ in kind, but only in the number of essential supporters or backs that need scratching. The size of this group determines almost everything about politics: what leaders can get away with and the quality of life or misery under them. And it is also the key to returning power to the people. |
Contents
1 The Rules of Politics | 1 |
2 Coming to Power | 21 |
3 Staying in Power | 49 |
4 Steal from the Poor Give to the Rich | 75 |
5 Getting and Spending | 101 |
6 If Corruption Empowers Then Absolute Corruption Empowers Absolutely | 127 |
7 Foreign Aid | 161 |
Other editions - View all
The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith No preview available - 2011 |
The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith No preview available - 2022 |
Common terms and phrases
Alastair Smith army autocracies autocrats better Bruce Bueno Bueno de Mesquita Carly Fiorina citizens coalition members Compaq corporate corruption cronies Damasus debt democracy democratic democratic leaders depends dictators disaster donors earthquake economic Egypt election essential backers essential supporters fight Fiorina foreign aid freedom funds Ghana government’s income incumbent influentials instance interchangeables Iran Israel keep large coalition Liberia look loyal loyalty masses means military million Mobutu Sese Seko nations organize Pakistan party people’s percent political survival politicians poor president private rewards problem protest Rawlings revenue revolution risk Rizzo Robert Mugabe rule Saddam Saddam Hussein selectorate selectorate theory shareholders small-coalition small-coalition regimes soldiers Soviet spend stay in power success Sun Tzu Taliban threat tion turn United UNSC vote voters wealth welfare winning coalition York Zimbabwe