The Governance of Not-for-Profit OrganizationsEdward L. Glaeser Not-for-profit organizations play a critical role in the American economy. In health care, education, culture, and religion, we trust not-for-profit firms to serve the interests of their donors, customers, employees, and society at large. We know that such firms don't try to maximize profits, but what do they maximize? This book attempts to answer that question, assembling leading experts on the economics of the not-for-profit sector to examine the problems of the health care industry, art museums, universities, and even the medieval church. Contributors look at a number of different aspects of not-for-profit operations, from the problems of fundraising, endowments, and governance to specific issues like hospital advertising. The picture that emerges is complex and surprising. In some cases, not-for-profit firms appear to work extremely well: competition for workers, customers, and donors leads not-for-profit organizations to function as efficiently as any for-profit firm. In other contexts, large endowments and weak governance allow elite workers to maximize their own interests, rather than those of their donors, customers, or society at large. Taken together, these papers greatly advance our knowledge of the dynamics and operations of not-for-profit organizations, revealing the under-explored systems of pressures and challenges that shape their governance. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
1 Ownership Form and Trapped Capital in the Hospital Industry | 45 |
2 Does Governance Matter? The Case of Art Museums | 71 |
3 HMO Penetration Ownership Status and the Rise of Hospital Advertising | 101 |
Evidence from the Mixed Hospital Industry | 117 |
The Sale of Private Chapels in Florentine Churches | 143 |
A Synthesis and Empirical Evaluation | 181 |
7 The Role of Nonprofit Endowments | 217 |
Contributors | 235 |
Author Index | 237 |
| 241 | |
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Above-median density altruism model Art Museum base salary beds bonus eligibility capacity changes Chicago churches coefficients collection competition cost decreases Dln(pop donations donors Economics effects elite workers empirical factor demand Florence florins for-profit firms for-profit hospitals FP hospitals FP share funds governance Hansmann Health Economics higher HMO penetration hospital advertising hospital market hypothesis incentives income increase industry institutional forms labor Lakdawalla managers market share Martin Feldstein Medicare Museum of Art NFP and FP NFP firms NFP status noncontractible quality model nonprofit firms nonprofit hospitals nonprofit organizations objective functions output owners/patrons ownership types patients percent level Philipson physician cooperative model population precautionary savings preferences private chapels profit regression religious Renaissance revenue Santa Maria Novella sector secular nonprofit significant staff supply shock teaching hospitals theories of NFP tion transept variables wages Weisbrod zip code
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Page viii - RELATION OF NATIONAL BUREAU DIRECTORS TO PUBLICATIONS REPORTING CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS Since the present volume is a record of conference proceedings, it has been exempted from the rules governing submission of manuscripts to, and critical review by, the Board of Directors of the National Bureau.