The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions

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Cambridge University Press, Feb 11, 2013 - Business & Economics - 254 pages
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This book explains why many institutional reforms in developing countries have limited success and suggests ways to overcome these limits. The author argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents.
 

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This book wonderful to allow us think something differently to make reform work. Thanks Matt.

Contents

Deconstructing the Puzzling Evidence of Reform
18
A New Perspective on This Puzzling Evidence
28
Overlooking the Change Context
35
How Institutional Contexts Impact Institutional Reforms
41
Getting Serious About Context
60
The Problem of Overspecified Oversimplified Reform
66
Limited Engagement Limited Change
89
Getting Inclusive about Agency
107
How ProblemDriven Learning Fosters Contextually Relevant
140
Institutional Reforms Can Be Improved Through
154
Finding and Fitting Solutions That Work
161
How Reforms Are Found and Fitted through Purposive
172
Broad Engagement Broader and Deeper Change
192
Broad Engagement through Mobilization Facilitates Broad
200
Reform Through Broadly Mobilized Agents
210
References
233

What Reform Limits Should Be Expected and Nhy?
113
Expecting Reforms That Are about Form Not Function
125

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About the author (2013)

Matt Andrews is a fellow at the Center for International Development at Harvard's Kennedy School and the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC. His numerous articles have appeared in journals such as Governance, the International Public Management Journal, the Public Administration Review, Oxford Development Studies, Public Administration and Development and the Journal of Development Studies. Prior to his fellowship at Harvard, Professor Andrews was a vice president of the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management and supported various government leaders in South Africa during the transition from apartheid. He has worked in more than twenty-five developing and transitional countries as a permanent member of the World Bank and as a Harvard University academic doing research on development and government reform. Dr Andrews received his PhD from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.

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