The Logical Structure of the World: And, Pseudoproblems in Philosophy

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Open Court Publishing, 2003 - Philosophy - 364 pages
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Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle. In The Logical Structure of the World, Carnap adopts the position of "methodological solipsism" and shows that it is possible to describe the world from the immediate data of experience. In his Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, he asserts that many philosophical problems are meaningless.
 

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Contents

CHAPTER
5
B THE PLAN OF THE INVESTIGATION
11
OUTLINE OF A CONSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEM
13
A THE FORM OF SCIENTIFIC STATEMENTS
19
B SURVEY OF THE OBJECT TYPES
31
A THE ASCENSION FORMS
47
B THE SYSTEM FORM
78
THE BASIS
98
A SOME PROBLEMS OF ESSENCE
247
B THE PSYCHOPHYSICAL PROBLEM
266
THE CONSTRUCTIONAL OR EMPIRICAL PROBLEM
273
THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF REALITY
281
E AIMS AND LIMITS OF SCIENCE
288
A THE MEANING OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
305
KNOWLEDGE OF
316
A THE MEANING CRITERION
325

The Basic Relations
122
The basic relations as basic concepts of the system 76 Part
134
E FORMS OF REPRESENTING
152
AUTOPSYCHOLOGICAL
175
PHYSICAL OBJECTS
191
HETEROPSYCHOLOG1CAL
214
B APPLICATION TO THE REALISM CONTROVERSY
332
SUMMARY
339
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INDEX OF NAMES
347
INDEX OF SUBJECTS I
356
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About the author (2003)

Born in Ronsdorf, Germany, Rudolf Carnap studied at the Universities of Freiburg and Jena from 1910 to 1914. He received his doctorate from Jena, where he had studied under Gottlob Frege, who, along with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell profoundly influenced his thought. In 1926, on the invitation of Morris Schlick, he joined the faculty of the University of Vienna. An active participant in the discussions of the Vienna Circle, he soon rose to eminence in the movement of logical positivism, or logical empiricism. From Vienna he went to Prague, and in 1930 he founded, with Hans Reichenbach in Berlin, the journal Erkenntnis, the main organ for the publications of the logical positivists and empiricists. In 1935, with the rise of Nazism, he moved to the United States, where he occupied teaching and research positions at the University of Chicago, Columbia University, the University of Illinois, and the University of California in Los Angeles. When he died, he was the most famous of the logical empiricists. Camap's book, The Logical Structure of the World (1928), established the basic project of logical empiricism. Carnap sought to demonstrate that, by the method of construction from elementary experiences, all the objects in the world that were also objects of knowledge could be attained. As a consequence, unless a statement could be validated either by rules of logic or by experimental testing in experience, it could be dismissed as devoid of knowledge. He thus proceeded to dismiss most of traditional philosophy and metaphysics as consisting of pseudo-problems. Carnap maintained that the genuine task of philosophy was the logical analysis of the language of science. In The Logical Syntax of Language (1934), he introduced basic distinctions, such as object-language and meta-language, formal mode and material mode of expression, that were to be widely accepted in philosophy. However, neither his symbolism nor his restriction of philosophy to the logical analysis of syntax---i.e., the purely formal features of language---endured. Influenced by Alfred Tarski, Carnap came to appreciate the need to take account of nonformal meanings (those involving external reference). This led to his publication of The Introduction of Semantics (1942), a work restricted to exclusively extensional logic, as was the subsequent volume, Formalization of Semantics (1943). However, he moved on to consider non-extensional logics in Meaning and Necessity. A leader in the unity of science movement, Carnap also wrestled with the empirical verification principle of meaning and the problems of induction and probability theory. His last major treatise was the book Logical Foundations of Probability (1950).

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