The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World
In this innovative and important work, Gerald Gaus advances a revised and more realistic account of public reason liberalism, showing how, in the midst of fundamental disagreement about values and moral beliefs, we can achieve a moral and political order that treats all as free and equal moral persons. The first part of this work analyzes social morality as a system of authoritative moral rules. Drawing on an earlier generation of moral philosophers such as Kurt Baier and Peter Strawson as well as current work in the social sciences, Gaus argues that our social morality is an evolved social fact, which is the necessary foundation of a mutually beneficial social order. The second part considers how this system of social moral authority can be justified to all moral persons. Drawing on the tools of game theory, social choice theory, experimental psychology and evolutionary theory, Gaus shows how a free society can secure a moral equilibrium that is endorsed by all, and how a just state respects, and develops, such an equilibrium.
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The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse ...
No preview available - 2010
abstract action agency Alf’s argued Baier basic beliefs Betty Betty’s chap choice claim classical liberal coerced coercion coercive conception conform cooperation coordination Coordination Game costs David Gauthier deliberation Deliberative Model different disagree Display equal moral persons equal persons equilibrium evaluative standards free and equal freedom fully rational fundamental game goals group H. L. A. Hart Hayek Hobbes Ibid idea ideal important individuals insist instrumentally rational Justice as Fairness Justificatory Liberalism Kantian Kurt Baier legislation liberty Members moral agents moral authority moral order moral rules Nash equilibrium norms number one’s optimal eligible set option P. F. Strawson payoff philosophers policy political order positive liberty preference principles problem proposals public justification public reason publicly justified Rawls reason to endorse reject relevant rule following simply social morality social order social rules society Strawson sufficient reason suppose system Theory of Justice think tion ultimatum games understand values view violate