The Philosophy of John Norris of BemertonReview Publishing Company, 1910 - 104 pages |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
absolutely according appears Aristotle Augustine Bakewell Bemerton Berkeley body Cambridge Platonists cause conception concerning Conduct of Human connection considered created Cudworth Descartes Dialogues Discourse discussion distinction Divine Ideas doctrine Eclaircissements edition Enneades Entretiens eternal essences Eternal Truths existence of matter explain Fraser hypothesis Ibid Ideal or Intelligible Ideal World immediately perceived inconsistent insists intellect Intellectual System Intelligible World John Norris knowledge Letters Locke Locke's Malebranche and Norris Marsilius Ficinus Mary Astell material objects material world ment mind Miscellanies modifications motion mutable Natural World necessary Neo-Platonic Norris's arguments Norris's philosophy Norris's theory occasional Open Court pain perception perfect Phaedo Philo Plato Plotinus principle prove Ralph Cudworth real existences reality Reason and Religion Recherche references relation Science sensation sense sensible soul spirit substance Summa contra Gentiles things Thomas Aquinas thought tion understanding University Vérité Wellesley College καὶ τὰ
Popular passages
Page 48 - By the name God, I understand a substance infinite, [eternal, immutable], independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created.
Page 83 - ... it hath never been explained, nor can it be explained, how external bodies, figures, and motions, should produce an appearance in the mind. These principles, therefore, do not solve, if by solving is meant assigning the real, either efficient or final, cause of appearances; but only reduce them to general rules.
Page 39 - manifold" because it contains many things in it; but what it contains it also is, and it being one is all these things. For neither are there many wisdoms, but one, in which are untold and infinite treasures of things intellectual, wherein are all invisible and unchangeable reasons of things visible and changeable which were created by it.
Page 24 - THEODORE: Think you that God feels the pain which we suffer? ARISTE: No, without doubt, for the Sentiment of Pain makes unhappy. THEODORE: Very well. But do you believe that he knows it? ARISTE: Yes, I believe he does, for he knows whatever happens to his Creatures. The Knowledge of God has no Bounds, and to know my Pain does not render him either miserable or imperfect. On the contrary — THEODORE: Oh, oh, Ariste! Gods knows Pain, Pleasure, Heat and the rest, and he does not feel these things....
Page 22 - We behold, then, by the sight of the mind, in that eternal truth from which all things temporal are made, the form according to which we are, and according to which we do anything by true and right reason, either in ourselves, or in things corporeal; and we have the true knowledge of things, thence conceived, as it were as a word within us, and by speaking we beget it from within; nor by being born does it depart from us.
Page 21 - ... self-existent and unchanging forms, and not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time? They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes. And what would you say of the many beautiful — whether men or horses or garments or any other things which may be called equal or beautiful — are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse?
Page 26 - And having been created in this way, the world has been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must therefore of necessity, if this is admitted, be a copy of something.
Page 39 - For God made nothing unwittingly; not even a human workman can be said to do so. But if He knew all that He made, He made only those things which He had known. Whence flows a very striking but true conclusion, that this world could not be known to us unless it existed, but could not have existed unless it had been known to God.
Page 40 - Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes quae in divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant: secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit.
Page 67 - And the existence of other individual souls is manifest to us, from their effects upon their respective bodies, their motions, actions, and discourse. Wherefore since the Atheists cannot deny the existence of soul or mind in men, though no such thing fall under external sense, they have as little reason to deny the existence of a perfect mind, presiding over the universe, without which it cannot be conceived whence our imperfect ones should be derived.