The Political Economy of Taxation in Latin America
Paying taxes is one of the least popular activities worldwide. Latin America in particular is notorious for having low direct taxes, weak compliance and enforcement, and high levels of inequality. Although fiscal extraction has gained renewed interest among governments in recent years, with the end of the commodity boom adding special urgency, the successful adoption and implementation of tax reforms is easier said than done, even when tax policy prescriptions are widely shared. This volume provides the first comprehensive, region-wide assessment of the role of political factors, including public opinion, democratic institutions, natural resources, interest groups, political ideology, and state capacity. What explains the region's low levels of taxation? What explains the low progressivity in its tax structure? And what explains considerable differences across countries? In addressing these questions, each of the volume's chapters makes original theoretical and empirical contributions toward understanding how to overcome the political challenges to taxation.
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Path Dependence Power Resources
Periods of Brazilian International
Particularistic Political Institutions and Tax Neutrality
Taxing Latin Americas Economic Elites
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Argentina Bolivia Brazil Brazilian business power business’s Cambridge University Press capacity capital central chapter Chile Colombia commodity boom contribution country’s decades Democracy democratic direct taxes economic elites Ecuador effects elections electoral system Estado Novo exports expropriation factors Fairfield fiscal federal fiscal federal bargain Flores-Macías government-take groups growth Guatemala Hallerberg ideology important incentives income tax industry inequality institutions instrumental power Inter-American Development Bank international insertion investment Latin America Latin American countries levels liberal Mahon ment Mexico Monaldi neoliberal o.oOO OECD oil prices Ondetti party personal income tax personal vote Peru policymakers Political Economy president Princeton production Progressive Tax Progressive Tax Reform redistributive preferences Reforms in Latin regime region regressive role São Paulo Scartascini Schneider share significant social spending state’s structural power subnational tax base tax burden tax compliance tax evasion tax policy tax rates tax revenue tax system taxpayers tion Uruguay variable Venezuela