The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking

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Charles Rowley, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon Tullock
Springer Science & Business Media, Jan 31, 1988 - Business & Economics - 492 pages
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It is now twenty years since the concept of rent-seeking was first devised by Gordon Tullock, though he was not responsible for coining the phrase itself. His initial insight has burgeoned over two decades into a major research program which has had an impact not only on public choice, but also on the related disciplines of economics, political science, and law and economics. The reach of the insight has proved to be universal, with relevance not just for the democracies, but also, and arguably more important, for all forms of autocracy, irrespective of ideological com plexion. It is not surprising, therefore, that this volume is the third edited publication dedicated specifically to scholarship into rent-seeking behavior. The theory of rent-seeking bridges normative and positive analyses of state action. In its normative dimension, rent-seeking scholarship has expanded, enlivened, in some respects turned on its head, the traditional welfare analyses of such features of modern economics as monopoly, externalities, public goods, and trade protection devices. In its positive dimension, rent-seeking contributions have provided an important analy tical perspective from which to understand and to predict the behavior of politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats, the media and the academy within the political market place. This bridge between normative and positive elements of analysis is invaluable in facilitating an understanding of and evaluating the costs of state activity within a consistent paradigm.
 

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Contents

Introduction
3
RentSeeking Versus Directly Unproductive ProfitSeeking Activities
15
In Search of RentSeeking
27
Rents and RentSeeking
51
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS
63
The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation A GameTheoretic Analysis
65
RiskAverse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power
81
Efficient RentSeeking Revisited
91
Voters as Investors A RentSeeking Resolution of the Paradox of Voting
241
Committees and RentSeeking Effort
251
Government and its Bureaucracy A Bilateral Bargaining Versus a PrincipalAgent Approach
267
DemandRevealing Transfers and RentSeeking
291
Competing for Aid
299
The Firm
313
Managerial Rents and Outside Recruitment in the Coasian Firm
315
Taxation
337

LongRun Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in RentSeeking
95
LongRun Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in RentSeeking A Comment
103
RentSeeking Behavior in the LongRun
107
Free Entry and Efficient RentSeeking
127
Back to the Bog
141
Life Among the Triangles and Trapezoids
147
APPLICATIONS
159
A Regulation
161
Dispelling the Disinterest in Deregulation
163
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory
179
International Trade
197
Ideology Interest Groups and the Repeal of the Corn Laws
199
RentSeeking and Trade Protection
217
Political Markets
239
Optimal Taxation in a RentSeeking Environment
339
The Environment
351
RentSeeking and Its Implications for Pollution Taxation
353
Privatizing the Commons An Improvement?
371
The Law And Legal Evolution
389
Corporate Chartering An Exploration in the Economics of Legal Change
391
Why Did the Industrial Revolution Occur in England?
409
TOWARD TOMORROW
421
Agency Economic Calculation and Constitutional Construction
423
RentSeeking in Constitutional Perspective
447
Future Directions for RentSeeking Research
465
Index
481
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