The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism
OUP Oxford, Jul 5, 1984 - Architecture - 277 pages
This book raises questions about the nature of philosophy by examining the source and significance of one central philosophical problem: how can we know anything about the world around us? Stroud discusses and criticizes the views of such philosophers as Descartes, Kant, J.L. Austin, G.E. Moore, R. Carnap, W.V. Quine, and others.
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The Problem of the External World
Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life
Internal and External
Empirical and Transcendental
Meaningful and Meaningless
The Quest for a Diagnosis
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accept answer appears argument assertions assessment basis beliefs Carnap claim to know common cold deny Descartes doubt dream-possibility dreaming empirical epistemic everyday example existence explain expressed external things external world fact false falsity G. E. Moore goldfinch hand human knowledge Hume's principles independent J. L. Austin Kant's kind know things knowledge is possible known ledge linguistic framework Malcolm mean meaningful meaningless Moore says Moore's proof naturalized epistemology objects ordinary particular perceive perception perhaps philo philosopher's philosophical investigation philosophical problem philosophical question philosophical scepticism physical world piece of paper position priori prove Quine Quine's realism reality reductio ad absurdum refute requirement sceptical conclusion sceptical philosopher scientific seems sense sensory experiences sensory surfaces simply sitting someone sopher sophical spotter suppose theory of knowledge thesis thing language thought traditional epistemologist traditional philosopher transcendental idealism true truth underdetermined understand understood verifiability principle verificationist W. V. Quine