The War Trap"This illuminating work is a masterful study that delves into the causes of war using a wholly new approach. Utilizing the assumptions of rational behavior, de Mesquita focuses on the perspective of decision making as an attempt to understand the phenomenon of war. . . . The book is highly stimulating. . . provocative, and certainly quite timely. . . a superb example of methodological exposition. . . Likely to appeal to the serious scholar of social sciences in general and of international relations in particular."--Ghulam M. Haniff, The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science "A major work. It is certain to inspire theoretical elaboration and refinement, additional testing of its propositions, and fruitful application. Moreover, it is destined to be considered a classic contribution to the scientific understanding of interstate conflict and war."--Frank C. Zagare, American Political Science Review "Rigorous and insightful analysis. . . . An important contribution to our theories of choice, relevant to all students of politics. The study is an exemplar in its development of systemic mini-theory accomplished by empirical tests of its propositions, completely worthy of emulation by those of us who profess to be political scientists, young and old."--Harold Guetzkow "A tour de force of theory, testing, and illustration."--Brice M. Russett |
Contents
Assumptions of the Theory | 19 |
The ExpectedUtility Theory | 46 |
Measuring Expected Utility | 93 |
Analyzing Conflict | 127 |
Speculation about Controlling the War Trap | 182 |
Common terms and phrases
actor adversary aligned alliances allies analysis Arab League Arrow's paradox assume assumption attack Austria-Hungary behavior believe bilateral Britain coalition commitments conflict initiators decision makers defense pact depends derived deterrence disputes distance dyads E(U₁ empirical equal to zero estimates expected value expected-utility calculation Expected-utility score Greater expected-utility theory fighting foreign policy France Germany i's perception indicator instance interests international conflict interstate interventions interstate threats Interstate War Initiation Iran Islamic Republic party j's policies k₁ leader Less than zero logic lose Middle East military negative expected utility Neuchâtel nonaligned outcome P₁ pair of nations peace percent politics positive expected utility potential preference orderings probability proposition region risk acceptant risk-averse Russians Singer and Small Soviet Soviet Union stronger Switzerland TABLE third parties Uiki Uikj uncertainty utility scores Vietnam weaker Yule's Q zero Less