The Case Against the Common Law
Central to the social functions and the foundational principles of the common law system is the concept of doctrinal stability as encapsulated in the institutional principle of stare decisis, or binding precedent. Under this principle, precedent binds subsequent similar cases when certain formal conditions are met. The doctrinal stability standard cannot survive significant deviation from the principle of stare decisis. Gordon Tullock demonstrates how the retreat from stare decisis in the U.S. common law system is a predictable consequence of adverse institutional characteristics. He concludes that this withdrawal is now sufficiently extensive as to challenge the validity of the common law system itself.
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The Ideal of the Common Law
The Common Law in Public Choice Perspective
The Plays the Thing
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