The economic theory of auctions, Volume 1
59 articles, dating from 1961 to 1999 Contributors include: J. Bulow, J.-J. Laffont, R.P. McAfee, E.S. Maskin, P.R. Milgrom, R.B. Myerson, A. Ortega-Reichert, J.G. Riley, J. Roberts, M. Shubik, J. Tirole, W. Vickrey, R. Weber, R. Wilson.
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Journal of Economic Surveys 13 3 July 22786
R Preston McAfee and John McMillan 1987 Auctions
THE BASIC ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL AUCTIONS REVENUE
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affiliated all-pay auction allocation analysis ascending auction assume assumption auction design auction forms auction mechanism AUCTION THEORY Auctions and Bidding Bulow and Klemperer buyer common-value Competitive Bidding condition constraints cost curve distribution double auction Dutch auction Econ Econometrica Economic Theory English auction equation example expected payment expected price expected profit expected revenue expected value first-price auction function Hence high bid auction higher highest implies incentive independent Journal of Economic Lemma marginal revenue Maskin and Riley McAfee and McMillan Milgrom and Weber Myerson Nash equilibrium number of bidders object open auction optimal auction paper PAUL KLEMPERER player private values probability of winning problem Proof reserve price result Revelation Principle revenue equivalence risk aversion risk neutral risk-neutral Samuelson second-price auction Section seller selling signal surplus symmetric equilibrium Theorem Theory of Auctions tion true value valuation value estimate Vickrey winner winner's curse zero