## The Economics of Work Effort and Alterntive Wage Payment Systems |

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### Contents

ALTERNATIVE WAGE PAYMENT SYSTEMS | 10 |

Alternative Wage Payment Systems | 21 |

SUPPLY OF WORK EFFORT AND THE OPTIMAL | 29 |

17 other sections not shown

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Appendix asterisk is inserted Chapter characteristics different from zero discussion dummy variables economic empirical analysis estimated coefficient Estimated Results evaluated probability expected utility experienced workers F-statistics F-test figures in brackets Firm A Firm first-order conditions guaranteed minimum wage Hence high guaranteed minimum hourly output human capital incentive pay income effect indifference curves individual's industries iso-profit curve labor logit analysis mainly marginal estimated probability marginal probability marginal productivity marginal rate Model N.B. The figures negative nominal piece-rates null hypothesis Number of Workers offers a higher optimal contract optimal wage contract output will exceed piece-rate system rate of substitution read Pencavel regression equation Results of Equation risk averse risk-sharing device sample second-order conditions significance level significantly different Singapore Singapore dollar skill Stiglitz Subgroup 1 Subgroup subgroup of workers substitution effect supply of effort task three firms true piece-rates value of hourly wage payment system workers in Firm workers in subgroup