The Modularity of Emotions
Luc Faucher, Christine Tappolet
University of Calgary Press, 2008 - Philosophy - 288 pages
Can emotions be rational or are they necessarily irrational? Are emotions universally shared states? Or are they socio-cultural constructions? Are emotions perceptions of some kind? Since the publication of Jerry Fodor's The Modularity of Mind (1983), a new question about the philosophy of emotions has emerged: Are emotions modular? A positive answer to this question would mean, minimally, that emotions are cognitive capacities that can be explained in terms of mental components that are functionally dissociable from other parts of the mind. But depending on the kind of modules that are considered, be they Chomskyan, Fodorian, Darwinian, and so on, the answer to this question might well be different. The twelve new essays in this volume address the question of whether emotions, or at least some of them, are, in some sense of the word, modules, and explore how this could potentially influence our understanding of emotional phenomena.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Quick and Smart? Modularity and the ProEmotion
Against Emotional Modularity
Emotions Are Not Modules
10 other sections not shown
activity affect-programs amygdala anger appraisal argue basic emotions behaviour beliefs bodily changes brain Cambridge Mass characteristic Charland claim cognitive impenetrability cognitive modules cognitive science complex concept consciousness Core Affect Damasio disgust displeasure Ekman Elster emotional contagion emotional response empirical evidence evolution evolutionary evolutionary psychology example explain face face perception facial expressions fear feeling fMRI Fodor Fodorian modularity function Griffiths hedonic tone horizontal modularity human emotions informationally encapsulated innate input interaction interoceptive involved Jerry Fodor kind limbic limbic system Louis Charland mechanisms mental Modularity of Mind modules natural natural selection neural Neuroscience Notch signalling objects one's output Oxford University Press pathway patterns Paul Ekman perception philosophy pleasure prefrontal cortex Prinz pro-emotion problem processes psychoevolutionary theory psychology question reactions reason reflexes representations role Science sense sensory shame signals situation Sousa specific stimulus structures studies suggests Theory of Emotion tion tive triggered vision visual