The Political Economy of James Buchanan
A survey of the political economy of James Buchanan seeking to explain his theories in detail and evaluate them in depth, covering topics such as the constitution and its failure, democracy, operational rules for the constitution and economics.
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agreement alternative anxious behavior benefits Buchanan and Tullock budget bureaucrats calculus Calculus of Consent ceteris paribus citizens clearly collective committed consensus constitutional political constitutional rules constitutionalist contract contractarian debt decision-making costs decision-making rule decisions democracy democratic economic economist elected ethical exchange exist expected external costs fact finance fiscal future genuine governmental homo economicus ibid imposed income individual inflation institutions interest involves J.M. Buchanan justice Keynesian Keynesian economics less libertarian liberty maximin means methodological individualism moral multi-period nature nonetheless normative outcome Pareto optimality persons PFDP political economy politicians position PPPD precisely precommitment principle public choice public sector public spending rational Rawls Rawlsian reason reform respect revealed preference self-interest simply social society student taxation theory Theory of Justice unanimity of consent utility values veil voluntary vote vote-selling vote-trading voters Wicksell Wicksellian WSED
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Limited preview - 2004