The Principles of Morals and Legislation
Clarendon Press, 1879 - Civil law - 378 pages
Discusses morals' functions and natures that affect the legislation in general. Bases the discussions on pain and pleasure as basic principle of law embodiment. Mentions of the circumstance influencing sensibility, general human actions, intentionality, conciousness, motives, human dispositions, consequencess of mischievous act, case of punishment, and offences' division.
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Common terms and phrases
according action appear applied belonging benevolence body branch called cause chapter character circumstances civil common concerning condition consequences considered consist constituted corresponds course danger depends desire dictates disposition distinct distinguished division effects engage evil example express follows force former give given greater ground hand happen happiness idea import indicated individual influence instance intention interest kind least legislator less man's manner material matter means mind mischief moral motive nature necessary never object observed occasion offences operate pain particular party penal perhaps person physical pleasures positive possession present principle produced punishment quantity question reason reference regard relation religion religious render reputation respect result Rule sanction secondary seems sense sensibility simple sort speak stand strength styled suffering supposed taken termed thing tion trust utility whole wrongful
Page xxv - ... govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.
Page 3 - ... with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is bad upon the whole. Take the balance; which, if on the side of pleasure, will give the general good tendency of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals concerned; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the same community.
Page xxv - Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that it is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it should be done; that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong action. When thus interpreted, the words ought, and right and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have done.
Page xxv - By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.
Page xxv - By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness...
Page 3 - Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by it in the first instance. 3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be produced by it after the first. This constitutes the fecundity of the first pleasure and the impurity of the first pain. 4. Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by it after the first.
Page xxv - The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is— what? The sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.
Page 111 - The value of the punishment must not be less in any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence.
Page xxix - ... which approves or disapproves of certain actions, not on account of their tending to augment the happiness, nor yet on account of their tending to diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question, but merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them: holding up that approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic ground.
Page 181 - The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny.