U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History |
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Contents
| 130 | |
| 135 | |
| 136 | |
| 139 | |
| 145 | |
| 150 | |
| 152 | |
| 153 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |
| 26 | |
| 37 | |
| 39 | |
| 40 | |
| 47 | |
| 48 | |
| 49 | |
| 50 | |
| 51 | |
| 54 | |
| 55 | |
| 60 | |
| 63 | |
| 67 | |
| 68 | |
| 69 | |
| 72 | |
| 77 | |
| 80 | |
| 87 | |
| 88 | |
| 94 | |
| 96 | |
| 97 | |
| 99 | |
| 100 | |
| 101 | |
| 108 | |
| 110 | |
| 112 | |
| 113 | |
| 114 | |
| 115 | |
| 116 | |
| 117 | |
| 118 | |
| 128 | |
| 155 | |
| 159 | |
| 160 | |
| 163 | |
| 166 | |
| 168 | |
| 169 | |
| 170 | |
| 171 | |
| 179 | |
| 180 | |
| 184 | |
| 185 | |
| 187 | |
| 189 | |
| 190 | |
| 192 | |
| 193 | |
| 194 | |
| 195 | |
| 196 | |
| 197 | |
| 198 | |
| 203 | |
| 204 | |
| 205 | |
| 211 | |
| 213 | |
| 214 | |
| 215 | |
| 216 | |
| 217 | |
| 218 | |
| 220 | |
| 223 | |
| 225 | |
| 227 | |
| 233 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
activities addition Agency Air Force American analysis Arlington Hall Army assigned Assistant attack became British Central Chief of Staff cipher Clarke COMINT command communications continued course cryptanalytic cryptographic Department Detachment direction dissemination Division effect efforts enemy equipment established existing exploitation fact field functions German given handling headquarters History important included increase intercept involved Japanese later letter machine Major material McCormack messages military Military Intelligence Navy necessary obtained officers operations organization Pearl period personnel persons possible prepared present problem production Radio Intelligence received responsibility secret Security Agency sent served Signal Corps Signal Intelligence Service Signal Security situation solution Special Branch stations success tactical taken technical text withheld theater tion traffic translated Ultra units Washington World
Popular passages
Page 172 - I have not reread them because my eye caught the word cryptograph. Now if this letter merely tells me that we were reading certain Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor and that at least two of them are still in current use, there is no point in my reading the letter because I already know that.
Page 39 - It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736a. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to your fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th...
Page 40 - Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you — twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged, if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.
Page 45 - I was sitting in my office in the Munitions Building reading from this paper the Japanese capabilities. Therefore from my point of view, I feel that Japan's potential capability against Pearl* Harbor was left from this estimate because neither Col. Betts nor I had any information which would lead us to believe that they were capable of or planned to do so. Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one final question again just to reiterate the fact that you personally had no knowledge of what Col. Bratton...
Page 39 - There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if the signing can be completed by the...
Page 100 - Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.
Page 39 - You should know this, however. I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within...
Page 105 - Attu and Kiska. Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys.
Page 130 - Those authorized to disseminate such information must employ only the most secure means, must take every precaution to avoid compromising the source, and must limit dissemination to the minimum number of secure and responsible persons who need the information in order to discharge their duties.
Page 130 - No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence of the source to the enemy.
Bibliographic information
| Title | U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History Volume 70, Issue 43 of CMH pub |
| Editors | James Leslie Gilbert, John Patrick Finnegan |
| Contributor | Center of Military History |
| Publisher | DIANE Publishing Inc., 1993 |
| ISBN | 0160378168, 9780160378164 |
| Length | 237 pages |
| Subjects | › › History / Military / World War II |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |