U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Documentary History

Front Cover
DIANE Publishing Inc., 1993 - World War, 1939-1945 - 237 pages
0 Reviews
 

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Contents

8 The End of Yardley
24
9 The Beginnings of the SIS
25
11 Conclusion
26
HISTORY OF THE SECOND SIGNAL SERVICE BATTALION
37
Department of Defense 1977
39
TESTIMONY OF BRIG GEN HAYES W KRONER excerpt 1944
40
Accepting the Challenge
47
ORIGIN FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS OF THE SPECIAL BRANCH MIS
48
B Handling of Intercept Intelligence Prior to the War
49
D Organization of MIS Section to Handle Intercepts
50
F Work of the Special Branch
51
G Increase in Volume of SSD Material
54
H Basic Factors in the Problem of Cryptanalytic Intelligence
55
I Personnel Situation of the Special BranchOfficers and Civilians
60
Papers from the Personal Files of Alfred McCormack Colonel AUS Special Branch G2 Military Intelligence Division War Department General Staff ...
63
Training the Force
67
HISTORY OF SCHOOLING OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN THE VINT HILL FARMS SCHOOL VINT HILL FARMS STATION WARRENT...
68
5 October 1942 to date
69
THE THIRD BATTLE OF MANASSAS
72
ADMINISTRATION FOR ALL CONCERNED
77
EDUCATION IN DARKEST VIRGINIA
80
Cracking the Codes
87
THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SIGNAL SECURITY AGENCY IN WORLD WAR II
88
II THE PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION
94
B TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
96
C CRYPTANALYSIS
97
D SOLUTIONS
99
1 Japanese Diplomatic and Military Attache Traffic
100
2 Japanese Army and Air Force Traffic
101
4 German Army and Air Force Traffic
108
8 Commercial Code Traffic
110
CENTRAL BUREAU CB
112
An Exhibit of the Important Types of Intelligence Recovered Through Reading Japanese Cryptograms excerpt BerlinTokyo Message 756 1944
113
1 Weapons connected with the Army
114
2 Weapons connected with the Navy
115
4 Equipment for Long Distance Bombardment Very Secret
116
Producing Intelligence
117
WAR EXPERIENCE OF ALFRED McCORMACK
118
MEMORANDUM FOR MR McCLOY Through GENERAL STRONG
128
ULTRA in the Southwest Pacific Area SWPA
155
The Politics of COMINT
159
Papers from the Personal Files of Alfred McCormack Memorandum for Mr McCloy Signal Intelligence Service 1942
160
Papers from the Personal Files of Alfred McCormack Memorandum for General McNamey 1944
163
Papers from the Personal Files of Alfred McCormack Memorandum for General Bissell ArmyNavy Agreement Regarding ULTRA 1944
166
B Proposed Restrictions
168
D Proper Interpretation of Agreement
169
E European Intelligence
170
Comments on MarshallDewey Exchange 1944
171
Tactical COMINT
179
Operational History of the 849th Signal Intelligence Service excerpt 1945
180
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
184
2 Cryptanalysis
185
4 Laboratory Facilities
187
3 Procurement and Training of Personnel
189
4 Organization and Equipment of Field Detachments
190
Summary of Operational Activity Signal Security Detachment D Covering the Period 1 September 1944 to 1 April 1945
192
4 G2 SECTION TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
193
5 SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE AND SIGNAL SECURITY COMPANIES 12TH ARMY GROUP
194
6 FLANKING ARMY GROUPS
195
THIRD ARMY RADIO INTELLIGENCE HISTORY IN CAMPAIGN OF WESTERN EUROPE
196
B Radio Intelligence Procedures
197
1 Operational Procedures
198
2 Communication SetUp of Radio Intelligence Agencies
203
C Captured Documents
204
OPERATIONAL HISTORY 126TH SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY
205
TECHNICAL SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE TRANSMITTED DIRECTLY TO G2 12th ARMY GROUP ETO FROM 14 AUGUST 1944 TO MAY 1945
211
Reshaping the Tools
213
CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF US ARMY SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
214
I Circumstances leading to proposal
215
II Proposal to theaters and replies thereto
216
Cryptanalysis
217
Low level signal intelligence
218
V Procedure for placing centralized control into effect
220
Appendixes
223
CHRONOLOGY
225
GLOSSARY
227
A DICTIONARY OF PEOPLE PLACES AND TERMS
233
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

Popular passages

Page 172 - I have not reread them because my eye caught the word cryptograph. Now if this letter merely tells me that we were reading certain Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor and that at least two of them are still in current use, there is no point in my reading the letter because I already know that.
Page 39 - It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736a. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to your fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th...
Page 40 - Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you — twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged, if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.
Page 45 - I was sitting in my office in the Munitions Building reading from this paper the Japanese capabilities. Therefore from my point of view, I feel that Japan's potential capability against Pearl* Harbor was left from this estimate because neither Col. Betts nor I had any information which would lead us to believe that they were capable of or planned to do so. Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one final question again just to reiterate the fact that you personally had no knowledge of what Col. Bratton...
Page 39 - There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if the signing can be completed by the...
Page 100 - Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.
Page 39 - You should know this, however. I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within...
Page 105 - Attu and Kiska. Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys.
Page 130 - Those authorized to disseminate such information must employ only the most secure means, must take every precaution to avoid compromising the source, and must limit dissemination to the minimum number of secure and responsible persons who need the information in order to discharge their duties.
Page 130 - No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence of the source to the enemy.

References to this book

Bibliographic information