U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of ..., 93-2, Mar. 4, 1974

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Page 27 - way of knowing whether they would actually do so. It would certainly be in their interest as well as ours to try to limit the terrible consequences of a nuclear exchange. By building into our forces a flexible capability, we at least eliminate the
Page 19 - Senator SYMINGTON. On page 56. you talk about a "response to a limited attack on military targets that caused relatively few civilian casualties." Do you really believe that such an attack against the United States is possible, and just what do you mean in numbers by relatively few civilian casualties?
Page 18 - specialized sets of targets possibly of concern to allies, with the greater economy of force, and to make it clear to a potential enemy that he cannot proceed with impunity to jeopardize our own system of hard targets. What type of targets of possible concern to our allies are you referring to ? Secretary SCHLESINGER. IRBM
Page 27 - attacks might be directed against military targets only, against cities only, or against both types of targets, either simultaneously or with a delay. They might be selective in terms of specific targets attacked or they might be general." "NATO should not only have an improved capability to meet major nonnuclear assaults with non-nuclear means
Page 27 - US strategic offensive forces have long been designed to carry out retaliatory options appropriate to the nature and level of provocation as well as to maintain an assured destruction capability. Our planning objectives and the sufficiency criteria for deterrence of direct strategic nuclear attack against the United States are
Page 11 - IT Senator CASE. This is the part that I think has to be stressed because I think it is the heart of anything new you have brought into this thing but, in fact, there isn't anything new because already we have targets, we have weapons targeted, individual targets that can be selected. Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes.
Page 17 - We know that and the Soviets should know it, and that is one of the reasons that I can publicly state that neither side can acquire a high confidence first-strike capability. I want the President of the United States to know that for all the future years, and I want the Soviet leadership to know that for all
Page 15 - you gave a list of the principal features of the proposed strategic posture. The fourth item is the objective and I quote, "The avoidance of any combination of forces that could be taken as an effort to acquire the
Page 11 - Secretary SCHLESINGER. Right. That is why I referred to it as targeting doctrine rather than the term retargeting that has been employed. It is the question of firing doctrine, and how you view the problem. You are quite right, Senator, to stress that aspect. Senator CASE. It is just a matter of thinking about it, isn't it
Page 27 - In order to maintain needed flexibility, we design our forces so that we have strategic alternatives available for use depending on the nature or level of provocation. This means capabilities that enable us to carry out an appropriate response without necessarily resorting to mass urban and industrial destruction." EXTRACT FROM FY 1974 POSTURE STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON

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