Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power

Couverture
Cambridge University Press, 19 juin 2000 - 292 pages
With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining is a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.
 

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Table des matières

Divided Government and Interbranch Bargaining
1
A Natural History of Veto Bargaining 19451992
33
Rational Choice and the Presidency
69
Models of Veto Bargaining
83
Explaining the Patterns
123
Testing the Models
152
Veto Threats
178
Interpreting History
203
Conclusion
247
References
271
Index
285
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