Wage and employment determination in a dynamic model with bilateral monopoly
Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 1983 - Business & Economics - 48 pages
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adjoint aggregate assumed atleast autoregressive process bargaining power bivariate CATHERWOOD LIBRARY coefficients collective bargaining Constrained contract curve control theory control variables yt decisions derive effects from past empirical employment determination employment level employment/wage Euler equations expect factor firm objective functions full rank functional form future values Hansen and Sargent information set lag operator lagged values lagged yt likelihood estimation likelihood function likelihood ratio test linear least squares locus matrix polynomial method model union negotiations nominal wage number of restrictions optimal control order autoregressive order lag profit functions qtr dummy real wage reduced-form estimating equation residuals restricted models significant sixth order social welfare function St variables structural parameters theoretical model time-series behavior tion union and firm union behavior union members union objective function union social welfare utility function v(wa values of St Vector Autoregressions wage and employment white noise workers zero