Wage bargaining in industries with market power
A. Jorge Padilla, Samuel Bentolila, Juan Josť Dolado, Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)
Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1994 - Business & Economics - 24 pages
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
assume bargaining outcome bargaining table Burlington Street cardinal complementarity conditions CEPR comparative statics results competing firms concave coordinate coordination game cross-derivatives direct effect Discussion Papers dUj/dwj equation equilibrium wage employment firm j's equilibrium firm j's manager firm level firm-level bargaining firm's high-wage higher wages impact increase in firm infimum interactions among competing j's equilibrium wage Layard low-wage equilibrium managers and unions market power model of wage monopolistic competition model monotonically increasing decreasing multiple equilibria Nash equilibrium numerical objective function oligopolistic oligopoly parameter configurations perfect Bayesian equilibrium price-cost margins product market competition Proposition reaction function right-to-manage model rises rival firm rival's wage Saint-Paul satisfies the cardinal standard statics analysis strategic complements strategic effects strategic interactions strategic nature strategic substitutes subscription subsidies supermodular game supremum survival probability Topkis unemployment benefits union associated unions and managers wage bargaining wage claims wage cut wage increases wages and employment wages are strategic workers