Weakening the OPEC cartel: an analysis and evaluation of the policy options : staff report to the Federal Trade Commission, Volume 10, Issue 3
John R. Haring, Calvin T. Roush, United States. Federal Trade Commission. Division of Industry Analysis
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Division of Industry Analysis : for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976 - Cartels - 35 pages
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Abu Dhabi action allocate production bargaining power benefit bilateral monopoly bilateral oligopoly break the cartel Bureau of Economics cartel price cartel's demise cartel's existence cessation of trade cheat chisel competition concessions consuming countries cost crude oil holdings cutbacks demand disrupt the cartel duction effective efficient excess capacity favor Federal Energy Administration Federal Trade Commission Foster Associates hypothesis Import Quota incentive International Oil Jacoby Krueger Kuwait large number latively M.A. Adelman major companies major oil companies market power market share member countries members of OPEC minimum price Multinational Oil number of buyers oil producing OPEC cartel OPEC countries OPEC Is Starting OPEC members OPEC nations OPEC oil OPEC production OPEC's ownership POLICY OPTIONS posted price pressure price increases problem producing countries prorationing Qatar quota tickets reduced relative bargaining strengths result revenues Rifai role Saudi Arabia sellers selling agents Seven Sisters supply tion U.S. Government U.S. Senate World Petroleum Market