What Should Constitutions Do?
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr, Jeffrey Paul
Cambridge University Press, Jan 31, 2011 - Philosophy
The essays in this volume - written by prominent philosophers, political scientists and legal scholars - address the basic purposes of constitutions and their status as fundamental law. Some deal with specific constitutional provisions: they ask, for example, which branches of government should have the authority to conduct foreign policy, or how the judiciary should be organized, or what role a preamble should play in a nation's founding document. Other essays explore questions of constitutional design: they consider the advantages of a federal system of government, or the challenges of designing a constitution for a pluralistic society - or they ask what form of constitution best promotes personal liberty and economic prosperity.
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LOREN E LOMASKY Contract Covenant Constitution
FERNANDO R TESÓN The Liberal Constitution and Foreign Affairs
SANFORD LEVINSON Do Constitutions Have a Point? Reflections
GERBER The Origins of an Independent Judiciary
ILYA SOMIN Foot Voting Political Ignorance
WILLIAM A GALSTON Pluralist Constitutionalism
JAMES S FISHKIN Deliberative Democracy and Constitutions
GUIDO PINCIONE The Constitution of Nondomination
RICHARD A EPSTEIN Can We Design an Optimal Constitution?
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