X-Efficiency: Theory, Evidence and Applications
My interest in X-Efficiency (XE) dates back to 1978. At the time, I was writing the dissertation for my Ph. D. at Washington State University. My dissertation was concerned with the role of attitudes in the school-to-work transition among young men. I was advised by Professor Millard Hastay (a member of my committee) to look at Leibenstein's "new" book, Beyond Economic Man. One of the things that caught my attention was his behavioral description of (selective) rationality. It seemed that Leibenstein' s behavioral description of a (selectively) rational individ ual was very similar to what psychologists such as Abraham Maslow were reporting as being the product of a particular motivational system. In other words, I was impressed with the idea that what Leibenstein was referring to as X-inefficiency was being discussed by psychologists as "the way it (often) is. " So from the beginning I always considered the concept ofX-(in)efficiency to be a valuable one for understanding human behavior. I have since come to believe that this is particularly true when considering behavior in non-market environments, i. e. , within the firm. Work on this book, however, can most realistically said to have started with work which I began in 1982 while I was a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University. Professor Leibenstein suggested that I consider how some empirical evidence which was being cited as evidence for the role of property rights might also be consistent with XE theory. (The consistency, in both directions, is considerable.
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Market Structure and Firm Organization
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4FCR allocative inefficiency APQT bundles assumed assumption average behavior benefits capital intensity ceteris paribus chapter ciency competition concept consumer surplus cost function cost minimization curve DeAlessi decision duopolist economies of scale effect efficiency effort level electric utility empirical employees environment estimated example existence external factors figure firm's frontier given growth Harvey Leibenstein hence higher costs independent variables individual industry inert area inputs intrafirm isocost isoquant Journal labor productivity Leibenstein less managers marginal cost market share market structure maximizing measured microeconomics minimum monopolist monopoly power motivation natural monopoly neoclassical theory nonmaximizing on-the-job leisure operating output rate owner owner-managed ownership form patrol percentage performance plant PmABPc pressure Primeaux prisoner's dilemma production function profit maximization profits ratio reduces regression regulation relatively rent-seeking reported represents sample unit costs wages welfare loss workers X-efficiency X-efficiency theory X-ineffi X-inefficiency XE theory
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