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10-pounder Parrott 44 Major advance Alexandria Antietam arrived artillery attack bank battery battle bridge brigade Burnside camp campaign Captain cavalry Chickahominy Colonel column command corps Couch's cross defence despatch direction division enemy enemy's eral field fire flank Fort Magruder Fort Monroe forward Franklin front G. B. McClellan general-in-chief guard guns H. W. Halleck Hagerstown Harper's Ferry Headquarters Army Heintzelman hill Hooker horses infantry James river Lieutenant Major General H. W. Major General McClellan Manassas Maryland ment miles Monroe morning move movement necessary night occupied officers operations Parrott guns Peninsula Peninsula campaign Pope Porter position possible Potomac President quartermaster railroad rear rebels received reconnoissance regiments reinforce Richmond road Savage's station Secretary Secretary of War sent Sharpsburg soon Sumner supplies telegram telegraphed tion transportation troops United States cavalry vicinity Virginia wagons Warrenton Washington Williamsburg York volunteers Yorktown
Page 90 - Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband, under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it.
Page 27 - That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.
Page 38 - That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.) " II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment...
Page 81 - I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men.
Page 30 - West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reenforced.
Page 34 - That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations, until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from the enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission.
Page 3 - We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance.
Page 110 - It will be seen from what has preceded that I lost no time that could be avoided in moving the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the support of the Army of Virginia ; that I spared no effort to hasten the embarkation of the troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News, and Yorktown, remaining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass of the army had sailed ; and that after my arrival at Alexandria, I left nothing in my power undone to forward supplies and re-enforcements to General Pope.
Page 96 - General, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview. And even after that interview I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, General,...