Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom
Laura Waddell Ekstrom
Westview Press, 2001 - Philosophy - 264 pages
A companion volume to Free Will: A Philosophical Study, this new anthology collects influential essays on free will, including both well-known contemporary classics and exciting recent work. Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom is divided into three parts. The essays in the first section address metaphysical issues concerning free will and causal determinism. The second section groups papers presenting a positive account of the nature of free action, including competing compatibilist and incompatibilist analyses. The third section concerns free will and moral responsibility, including theories of moral responsibility and the challenge to an alternative possibilities condition posed by Frankurt-type scenarios. Distinguished by its balance and consistently high quality, the volume presents papers selected for their significance, innovation, and clarity of expression. Contributors include Harry Frankfurt, Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis, Elizabeth Anscombe, John Martin Fischer, Michael Bratman, Roderick Chisholm, Robert Kane, Peter Strawson, and Susan Wolf. The anthology serves as an up-to-date resource for scholars as well as a useful text for courses in ethics, philosophy of religion, or metaphysics. In addition, paired with Free Will: A Philosophical Study, it would form an excellent upper-level undergraduate or graduate-level course in free will, responsibility, motivation, or action theory.
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Are We Free to Break the Laws? David Lewis
A New Compatibilism John Martin Fischer
Causality and Determination Elizabeth Anscombe
Free Agency Gary Watson
Identification Decision and Treating as a Reason
Freedom and Resentment Peter Strawson
The Reason View Susan Wolf
Libertarianism and Frankfurts Attack on the Principle
Rescuing FrankfurtStyle Cases Alfred R Mele
Human Freedom and the Self Roderick M Chisholm
ability to act able act in accordance addict agent agent-causal argue argument Autonomy View believe Bob's causal determinism cause choice choose claim compatibilism compatibilist concept decide to steal deciding at tl decision deterministic drug Elizabeth Anscombe event example fact first-order desires Fischer fixity Frankfurt Frankfurt-style free act free action free agency freedom Galen Strawson Ginet hand at T2 happen Harry Frankfurt human identification indeterminism indexical possibilism Inwagen J. L. Austin Jones Jones's Journal of Philosophy kill Smith libertarian Mele metaphysical morally responsible motives notion otherwise past perform person Peter van Inwagen Philosophical physical possible worlds preference premises problem proposition question raised my hand raising her hand reactive attitudes Real Self View Reason View reason-giving right reasons right thing Roderick Chisholm second-order desires sense simply sort steal the car suppose Susan Wolf thesis tion tl to steal treat true wants Widerker world-indexed truths
Page 62 - Ideas always represent their objects or impressions ; and, vice versa, there are some objects necessary to give rise to every idea. If we pretend, therefore, to have any just idea of this efficacy, we must produce some instance wherein the efficacy is plainly discoverable to the mind, and its operations obvious to our consciousness or sensation.
Page 78 - first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective selfevaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.
Page 126 - ... 2. Let us consider some deed, or misdeed, that may be attributed to a responsible agent: one man, say, shot another. If the man was responsible for what he did, then, I would urge, what was to happen at the time of the shooting was something that was entirely up to the man himself. There was a moment at which it was true, both that he could have fired the shot and also that he could have refrained from firing it. And if this is so, then, even though he did fire it, he could have done something...
Page 82 - The essential characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care about his will. His desires move him to do certain things, without its being true of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires. The class of wantons includes all nonhuman animals that have desires and all very young children.
Page 78 - Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are simply desires to do or not do one thing or another.
Page 127 - For example, if what we say he did was really something that was brought about by a second man, one who forced his hand upon the trigger, say, or who, by means of hypnosis, compelled him to perform the act, then since the act was caused by the second man it was nothing that was within the power of the first man to prevent. And precisely the same thing is true, I think, if instead...
Page 58 - CAUSE simply, or an entire cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents how many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; which when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant; and if any one of them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect is not produced.
Page 88 - ... does — we need not, though we may. We may say that the hand was moved by the man, but we may also say that the motion of the hand was caused by the motion of certain muscles; and we may say that the motion of the muscles was caused by certain events that took place within the brain. But some event, and presumably one of those that took place within the brain, was caused by the agent and not by any other events.
Page 103 - There is no theoretical limit to the length of the series of desires of higher and higher orders; nothing except common sense and, perhaps, a saving fatigue prevents an individual from obsessively refusing to identify himself with any of his desires until he forms a desire of the next higher order.
Page 200 - ... (These, of course, are not contingent connections.) But these attitudes of disapprobation and indignation are precisely the correlates of the moral demand in the case where the demand is felt to be disregarded. The making of the demand is the proneness to such attitudes. The holding of them does not...