The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods
Cambridge University Press, Jun 28, 1996 - Business & Economics - 590 pages
This book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e. uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods. The new edition updates and expands the discussion of externalities and their implications, coverage of asymmetric information, underlying game-theoretic formulations, and intuitive and graphical presentations. Aimed at well-prepared undergraduates and graduate students making a serious foray into this branch of economics, the analysis should also interest professional economists wishing to survey recent advancements in the field. No other single source for the range of materials explored is currently available.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Theory of externalities
Externalities equilibrium and optimality
Externalities and private information
Alternative mechanisms for provision of public goods
Departures from NashCournot behavior
Homogeneous clubs and local public goods
Clubs in general
Institutional forms and clubs
Game theory and club goods
Other editions - View all
additional agent allocation allow alternative analysis applied associated assumed assumption average behavior benefits Chapter characteristics choice choose club commodity concerns condition congestion consider consistent constraint consumers consumption contribution core cost crowding curve decision demand depends derived determined discussion distribution economy effect efficiency Emma equal equation estimated examined example exclusion existence expected externalities facility fees Figure further given implies important incentive income increase individual individual's institutional interesting involve issues marginal Maximize mechanism membership Nash equilibrium optimal optimum outcome Pareto payoffs period player population positive possible preferences present problem production provision pure public quantity reported represents requires resource respect responses restricted result Sandler scheme sharing simple situations solution strategy structure Suppose theory tion toll unit utility function valuation variable visits zero