The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club GoodsThis book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e. uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods. The new edition updates and expands the discussion of externalities and their implications, coverage of asymmetric information, underlying game-theoretic formulations, and intuitive and graphical presentations. Aimed at well-prepared undergraduates and graduate students making a serious foray into this branch of economics, the analysis should also interest professional economists wishing to survey recent advancements in the field. No other single source for the range of materials explored is currently available. |
Contents
List of tables and figures page xii | 9 |
Views on market intervention 3 | 11 |
Equilibrium concepts in public economics | 17 |
Theory of externalities | 39 |
Externalities equilibrium and optimality | 68 |
Externalities and private information | 102 |
NashCournot equilibria | 143 |
Alternative mechanisms for provision of public goods | 198 |
Clubs in general | 370 |
Institutional forms and clubs | 394 |
Game theory and club goods | 415 |
Uncertainty and the theory of clubs | 435 |
Intergenerational clubs | 461 |
Empirical estimation and public goods | 483 |
Applications and empirics | 506 |
Conclusions and directions for future research | 536 |
Public goods in general | 240 |
Game theory and public goods | 300 |
Departures from NashCournot behavior | 327 |
Homogeneous clubs and local public goods | 347 |
public goods | 363 |
| 553 | |
| 581 | |
| 587 | |
Other editions - View all
The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods Richard Cornes,Todd Sandler No preview available - 1996 |
The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods Richard Cornes,Todd Sandler No preview available - 1996 |
The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods Richard Cornes,Todd Sandler No preview available - 1996 |
Common terms and phrases
agent allocation alternative analysis associated assumption behavior budget constraint Chapter characteristics choice choose club theory commodity comparative static congestion consider consumers consumption contribution core crowding demand functions denote derived economics economies of scope efficiency Emma equal equation example exogenous externalities facility fees Figure first-order conditions Frank game theory given high valuer homogeneous implies impure public incentive income increase indifference curves indirect utility function individual individual's intergenerational clubs involve Lindahl equilibrium low valuer marginal cost Maximize mechanism mixed clubs multiproduct clubs Nash equilibrium number of clubs optimal outcome parameters Pareto optimum Pareto-efficient Pareto-optimal payoffs Pigouvian taxes player population preferences problem provision level public good model public good provision pure public quantity reaction curve requires resource responses result Sandler Scotchmer Section social welfare function strategy subgame perfect equilibrium Suppose tion toll Tschirhart unit variable visits zero