The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive PossibilitiesWhen used in conjunction with corporations, the term public is misleading. Anyone can purchase shares of stock, but public corporations themselves are uninhibited by a sense of societal obligation or strict public oversight. In fact, managers of most large firms are prohibited by law from taking into account the interests of the public in de... |
Contents
FUNDAMENTAL | 1 |
CORPORATE LAW AS PUBLIC | 39 |
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES | 204 |
258 | 318 |
FRONT COVER BACK COVER BACK COVER | 457 |
FLAP | 499 |
Index | 505 |
Other editions - View all
The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities Kent Greenfield No preview available - 2007 |
The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities Kent Greenfield No preview available - 2010 |
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