Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance in the U.S. and Japan |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Ownership Structure Theory | 16 |
Ownership Structure in Japan | 22 |
Copyright | |
5 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
agency costs analysis Aoki Assets Grouped capital structure Carolyn K causality coefficient in parenthesis Corporate Control corporate performance debtholders deviation of skewness different from remaining Director Ownership Distribution of Productivity efficient behavior empirical equity ownership evidence Financial Economics financial institutional ownership Financial Ownership Firm Leverage firms with high focus George Michael high corporate ownership high institutional ownership hypothesis influence of ownership inputs insider ownership institutional investors institutional shareholders intercorporate investment Japanese firms Japanese sample Journal of Financial Keiretsu lapses from efficient large principal large shareholder leverage ratios Low High management and shareholders management ownership mean-median measure monitoring negative influence ownership and productivity ownership influence Ownership Productivity ownership share ownership structure positive influence positive relationship production function Productivity Residuals Grouped profitability Quantiles 95 R-squared reduce relationship between ownership remaining sample Return on Assets significance level significant positive skewness coefficient standard deviation suggests total factor productivity U.S. Sample variables Within-firm