Explaining Constitutional Change: A Positive Economics ApproachThis book aims to extend the current research and debate in constitutional economics by using a positive economics approach. Born out of discontent with the current state in constitutional economics, this book presents an inquiry in the possibilities of a positive constitutional economics, and how societies choose their constitutional rules. Drawing on economics, the book examines the emergence of constitutions and how and why they change over time. The author proposes that model constitutions are based on, and backed by institutions which have developed spontaneously. He presents some predictions on the scope of constitutional change under various constitutional settings and factors which cause constitutional change. Stefan Voigt concludes that constitutional change is reconceptualized as the outcome of a bargaining game, in which changes reflect the altered bargaining power of the actors. This book will be welcomed by academics working in the fields of political economy, law and economics as well as those from the public choice and new institutional schools of thought. |
Contents
Two Competing Approaches to Constitutional | 7 |
The Possibility of Positive Constitutional Economics | 37 |
Positive Constitutional Economics A Survey | 61 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
actors analyzed approach argued argument assume assumptions bargaining process bargaining theory basic behavior bicameral central ceteris paribus change the constitution chapter collective action comparative institutional analysis concept concerning conjecture constitutional amending organ constitutional competition constitutional contract constitutional court constitutional economists constitutional political economy constitutional rules constraints conventions decisions democracy effects emergence enforced evaluating existence exit expected explicit explicitly exploitation external function government branches Hayek ibid ideal point implicit constitutional change individual interest groups internal institutions interpretation judges judiciary kind of constitutional legislation legislature modified nomological hypotheses normative notion oppose opposition outcomes participants parties players politicians positive constitutional economics possible potential predictions preferences procedures property rights public choice public choice theory rational relevant rent-seeking research program result seems separation of powers social contract society specific spontaneous order Suppose theory of constitutions tolerance span U.S. Constitution U.S. Supreme Court utility Vanberg welfare economics