Contemporary Materialism: A Reader
Contemporary Materialism brings together the best recent work on materialism from many of our leading contemporary philosophers. This is the first comprehensive reader on the subject. The majority of philosophers and scientists today hold the view that all phenomena are physical, as a result materialism or 'physicalism' is now the dominant ontology in a wide range of fields. Surprisingly no single book, until now, has collected the key investigations into materialism, to reflect the impact it has had on current thinking in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and the theory of value. The classic papers in this collection chart contemporary problems, positions and themes in materialism. At the invitation of the editors, many of the papers have been specially up-dated for this collection: follow-on pieces written by the contributors enable them to appraise the original paper and assess developments since the work was first published. The book's selections are largely non-technical and accessible to advanced undergraduates. The editors have provided a useful general introduction, outlining and contextualising this central system of thought, as well as a topical bibliography. Contemporary Materialism will be vital reading for anyone concerned to discover the ideas underlying contemporary philosophy. David Armstrong, University of Sydney; Jerry Fodor, Rutgers University, New Jersey; Tim Crane, University College, London; D. H. Mellor, Univeristy of Cambridge; J.J.C.
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Naturalism Materialism and First Philosophy
NATURALISM MATERIALISM AND FIRST PHILOSOPHY RECONSIDERED
There is no Question of Physicalism
Sensations and Brain Processes
Things and their Place in Theories
Physicalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation
Why There Isnt a Readymade World
Evolution Error and Intentionality
The Scientific and the Ethical
How to be a Moral Realist
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anomalous monism anti-realist argue argument behavior beliefs Boyd brain process Cambridge cause claim cognitive conception D. H. Mellor Davidson definitions depend disjunction doctrine Dretske dualism eliminative materialism empirical entails entities epistemically determine epistemological ethical example existence explanation explanatory fact Fodor folk psychology functional homeostatic human indeterminacy indeterminacy of translation intentional intentionality intrinsic intuitions irreducible judgments knowledge language logical materialism materialist matter meaning mechanisms mental events metaethics metaphysical methodological mind moral realism multiple realizability natural kind naturalistic nomological non-mental nonreductive notion numbers observation ontological Oxford particular phenomena philosophical philosophy of science physical events physical objects physicalist plausible possible principle priori problem properties propositional attitudes psychological psychophysical Putnam question Quine Quine's reduction reference relevant role scientific scientific realism semantic sensations sense sentences social sort special sciences statements supervenience suppose theoretical thesis things token translation true truth two-bitser University Press