Controversy in Marketing Theory: For Reason, Realism, Truth, and Objectivity

Shelby D. Hunt

M.E. Sharpe, Feb 28, 2003 - Business & Economics

In this book distinguished theorist and author Shelby D. Hunt analyzes the major controversies in the "philosophy debates" raging throughout the field of marketing. Using an historical approach, Hunt argues against relativism and for scientific realism as a philosophy for guiding marketing research and theory. He also shows how the pursuit of truth and objectivity in marketing research are both possible and desirable. Specific controversies analyzed in the book include: Does positivism dominate marketing research? Does positivism imply quantitive methods? Is relativism an appropriate foundation for marketing research? Does relativism imply pluralism, tolerance, and openness? Should marketing pursue the goal of objective research? An ideal companion to Hunt's classic text, Foundations of Marketing Theory, this volume will be equally useful on its own in any graduate level course on marketing theory.

Contents

• II: 3
• III: 5
• IV: 6
• V: 10
• VI: 11
• IX: 13
• X: 15
• XI: 16
• XII: 17
• XIII: 20
• XIV: 23
• XV: 26
• XVI: 27
• XVIII: 29
• XIX: 30
• XX: 31
• XXII: 32
• XXIII: 33
• XXIV: 34
• XXV: 36
• XXVI: 37
• XXVII: 38
• XXVIII: 41
• XXIX: 42
• XXX: 45
• XXXI: 47
• XXXII: 48
• XXXIII: 50
• XXXIV: 53
• XXXV: 54
• XXXVII: 55
• XXXVIII: 57
• XXXIX: 60
• XL: 62
• XLI: 64
• XLII: 67
• XLIII: 73
• XLV: 74
• XLVI: 76
• XLVII: 79
• XLVIII: 82
• XLIX: 86
• L: 87
• LI: 88
• LII: 89
• LIV: 90
• LVI: 93
• LVII: 95
• LVIII: 98
• LX: 99
• LXI: 100
• LXII: 102
• LXIII: 105
• LXIV: 107
• LXV: 111
• LXVI: 114
• LXVIII: 118
• LXIX: 120
• LXX: 126
• LXXI: 129
• LXXII: 131
• LXXIII: 133
• LXXIV: 135
• LXXV: 137
• LXXVI: 142
• LXXVII: 147
• LXXVIII: 148
• LXXIX: 149
• LXXX: 151
• LXXXI: 153
• LXXXII: 156
• LXXXIII: 158
• LXXXIV: 161
• LXXXV: 164
• LXXXVI: 168
• LXXXVII: 170
• LXXXVIII: 172
• LXXXIX: 177
• XC: 179
• XCI: 182
• XCII: 183
• XCIII: 184
• XCIV: 188
• XCVI: 189
• XCVII: 191
• XCVIII: 194
• XCIX: 196
• C: 199
• CI: 200
• CII: 201
• CIII: 202
• CIV: 204
• CV: 205
• CVI: 208
• CVII: 210
• CIX: 212
• CXI: 214
• CXII: 215
• CXIII: 216
• CXIV: 217
• CXV: 219
• CXVI: 221
• CXVII: 222
• CXVIII: 223
• CXIX: 225
• CXX: 226
• CXXI: 227
• CXXIII: 230
• CXXV: 232
• CXXVI: 235
• CXXVII: 236
• CXXVIII: 237
• CXXIX: 238
• CXXX: 240
• CXXXI: 241
• CXXXII: 242
• CXXXIV: 244
• CXXXV: 246
• CXXXVI: 247
• CXXXVII: 248
• CXXXVIII: 250
• CXXXIX: 253
• CXLI: 256
• CXLII: 257
• CXLIII: 260
• CXLIV: 263
• CXLV: 265
• CXLVI: 268
• CXLVII: 270
• CXLVIII: 272
• CXLIX: 273
• CL: 275
• CLI: 277
• CLII: 280
• CLIII: 281
• CLIV: 285
• CLVI: 286
• CLVII: 288
• CLIX: 290
• CLX: 291
• CLXI: 292
• CLXII: 293
• CLXIII: 295
• CLXIV: 297
• CLXV: 298
• CLXVI: 302
• CLXVII: 303
• CLXVIII: 306
• CLXIX: 307
• CLXX: 308
• CLXXI: 311
• CLXXII: 331

Popular passages

Page 67 - If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number'} No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.‎

Page 87 - The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it. The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man — whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory — may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge.‎

Page 35 - As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.‎

Page 104 - For the relativist there is no sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational as distinct from merely locally accepted as such.‎

Page 108 - Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language that we use. The concepts we have settle for us the form of the experience we have of the world...‎

Page 64 - Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions," but to make propositions clear.‎

Page 221 - There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its "real" counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle.‎

Page 118 - Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience. Like the gestalt switch, it must occur all at once (though not necessarily in an instant) or not at all.‎

Page 30 - Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past.‎

Page 100 - There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative.‎

Bibliographic information

• Title: Controversy in Marketing Theory: For Reason, Realism, Truth, and Objectivity
• Author: Shelby D. Hunt
• Publisher: M.E. Sharpe, 2003
• ISBN: 0765640147, 9780765640147
• Subjects: Business & Economics / Management; Business & Economics / Marketing / General