Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesRoughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
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... ( IMF ) and the IMF's major shareholders often faced a sharp choice : Bar- ring a major rescue loan or an agreement - which was always difficult to achieve with the crisis country's creditors to defer payments , the coun- try would ...
... ( IMF ) and the IMF's major shareholders often faced a sharp choice : Bar- ring a major rescue loan or an agreement - which was always difficult to achieve with the crisis country's creditors to defer payments , the coun- try would ...
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... IMF and bilateral first- and second - line financing Rate of IMF loan disbursement and repayment Changes in IMF / bilateral exposure and 125 126 international bank claims on crisis countries 131 Table 4.4 Table 9.1 Table A.1 Changes in ...
... IMF and bilateral first- and second - line financing Rate of IMF loan disbursement and repayment Changes in IMF / bilateral exposure and 125 126 international bank claims on crisis countries 131 Table 4.4 Table 9.1 Table A.1 Changes in ...
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... IMF's managing director , the US treasury secretary , or the finance minis- ter of another G - 7 country without giving their staff a heads up . But it is hard at times even for the flotilla of economists at the IMF , Treasury De ...
... IMF's managing director , the US treasury secretary , or the finance minis- ter of another G - 7 country without giving their staff a heads up . But it is hard at times even for the flotilla of economists at the IMF , Treasury De ...
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... IMF or G - 7 efforts to catalyze a consensual restructuring are just as bad , if not worse , than large bailouts : The involvement of the IMF tarnishes the official sector with the country's decision not to pay on time . It is not ...
... IMF or G - 7 efforts to catalyze a consensual restructuring are just as bad , if not worse , than large bailouts : The involvement of the IMF tarnishes the official sector with the country's decision not to pay on time . It is not ...
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... IMF's funds , have strategic as well as financial interests at stake . Moreover , the economic and financial losses from an uncontained crisis typically spill over beyond the crisis country's borders , and its policy choices will influ ...
... IMF's funds , have strategic as well as financial interests at stake . Moreover , the economic and financial losses from an uncontained crisis typically spill over beyond the crisis country's borders , and its policy choices will influ ...
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Common terms and phrases
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
Popular passages
Page 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
Page 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as