Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism
Howard Robinson, Soros Professor of Philosophy at Eotvos Lorand University Budapest and Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy Howard Robinson
Cambridge University Press, Sep 9, 1982 - Philosophy - 130 pages
The assumption of materialism (in its many forms) Howard Robinson believes is false. In his book he presents a very forceful critique of the modern forms that materialism has taken. In telling discussions of the theory of supervenience put forward by Davidson and Peacocke, the central state materialism attributable to Smart, Armstrong and others, Putnam's functionalism, and Rorty's disappearance theory, he shows that, whatever their local inconsistencies, these forms of materialism all overlook or quite inadequately explain elementary and unimpeachable intuitions about our own mental experiences. Robinson concludes with a consideration of the alternative views of the matter of which the mind is held to consist. These arguments will either serve to crystallise for the most part inchoate opposition to materialism among a number of philosophers, and will challenge its proponents to find a more secure defence for the basis of their view.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Supervenience and reduction
Behaviourism and stimulus materialism
The causal theory of mind
The disappearance theory
Reductive theories of perception
turning the tables
Other editions - View all
actualisation analysis of mind appropriate argued argument Armstrong Armstrong's theory behaviouristic theories belief theory body brain c-fibres causal properties causal theory cause central nervous system characterisation claim colour concept connexion consciousness covert behaviour criterion deny disappearance theory discussion entail entities epiphenomenal event identity example fact feature follows functionalism functionalist given holism identity theory impenetrability internal object interpretation intrinsic introspection intuitive involve J. J. C. Smart logical macroscopic materialism materialist materialist theories matter mental events nature normal notion object of awareness objects of experience ontology pain-behaviour perceiving philosophers philosophy of mind physical events physicalist plausible possess possible predicates problem psychological realist theory recognise reductionism reductionist reductive reductive materialism reference relation Rorty secondary qualities seems sensation sense contents Smart someone sort statements stimulus structure supervenience tables theory of dispositions theory of mind theory of perception things tion topic neutral topic-neutral analysis